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BETTER TO GIVE THAN TO RECEIVE:
SHOULD NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS AND
CHARITIES PAY PUNITIVE DAMAGES?
Charity suffereth long and is kind, but in the common law it cannot be
careless. When it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes actionable
wrongdoing.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of charitable immunity2 originated in the dicta of two early
English cases. 3 American courts adopted and expanded the English dicta, 4 and
1. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir.
1942) (Rutledge, J.).
2. "[llmmunity means exemption from the application of general tort rules which, but for the
charitable character of the tortfeasor, would apply." E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Immunity of
Nongovernmental Charity from Liability for Damages in Tort, 25 A.L.R. 2d. 29, 45 (1952). "An
immunity avoids liability in tort . . . because of the status . . . of the favored defendant."
Introductory Note, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 392 (1977). "The immunity was
traditionally quite broad and protected the defendant even in cases that undoubtedly involved tortious
behavior [on the part of the defendant]." W. PAGE KEETON EL" AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, Immunities § 131, at 1032 (5th ed. 1984). "The idea was that, even though the
defendant might be a wrongdoer, social values of great importance required that the defendant escape
liability." Id. See aLso 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 189 (1976); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 234
(6th ed. 1991).
For an organization to receive the benefit of charitable immunity, the organization had to be
adjudicated "charitable." See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 211 (1976). "Charitable," however, is
a difficult term to define and has both a lay meaning and a legal meaning. Id. at §§ 2, 3. Charity,
in its legal sense, is not aid to the needy alone, but encompasses all which seeks to improve the
human condition. Id. Under the common law, diffusion of knowledge, acquiring knowledge of the
arts and sciences, and the advancement of learning without any reference to serving the poor were
considered charitable objects. See, e.g., Waddell v. Young Women's Christian Assoc., 15 N.E.2d
140, 142 (Ohio 1938). Charity was defined as any gift made for a general public use for the benefit
of an indefinite number of persons, designed to benefit them in educational, religious, moral,
physical, or social ways. See In re Funk's Estate, 45 A.2d 67, 69 (Pa. 1946). See also Trustees
of New Castle Common v. Megginson, 77 A. 565, 570 (Del. 1910) ("It is obvious that the word
'charitable' implies primarily a donation to the poor, the sick, or the needy. But, it has undoubtedly
has been given a much broader definition. . . . "). See also 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 3 (1976).
Therefore, charity and benevolence are not synonymous. Id. at §§ 3, 4.
3. Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846); Holliday v. The Vestry of
the Parish of St. Leonard, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
In Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital, Lord Cottenham, relying on Duncan v. Findlater, 7 Eng.
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by 1938, forty states held that charities were immune from paying damages in
tort actions.' Throughout the history of the doctrine of charitable immunity,
courts enunciated various theories to explain why charities should be immune
from paying damages in tort.6
Rep. 934 (1839), stated that "[to give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those
objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different
purpose." 8 Eng. Rep. at 1510. Although this dicta was later relied on by some American courts
in crafting the doctrine of charitable immunity, it is interesting to note that none of these cases
involved tortious conduct on the part of a charity. See Schopler, supra note 2, at 38-40; Note,
Developments in the Law - Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1578, 1679-80 (1992)
[hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Note, The Quality of Mercy: 'Charitable Tons' and Their
Continuing Immunity, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1383-84 (1987) [hereinafter The Quality of Mercy];
JohnR. Feather, Comment, The Immunity of Charitable Institutionsfrom Tort Liability, 11 BAYLOR
L. REV. 86, 86-89 (1959). In addition, 10 years before the American courts adopted these cases,
these cases were overruled by Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866). In fact, in
England, charities remained liable for their torts. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lindsey County Council,
340 K.B. 516 (1935), aff'd, 483 App. Case 97 (1937).
4. Massachusetts was the first state to announce the doctrine of charitable immunity in this
country in McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). In McDonald, the
plaintiff fell from a building while he was at work and was taken to Massachusetts General Hospital.
Id. at 432. The hospital was in the business of providing medical care to indigents at little or no
cost and based the cost of treatment on the patients' ability to pay for services rendered. Id. at 433.
While at the hospital, the plaintiff received "nurses, bed, food, warmth ... other comforts... ,"
and medical care free of charge. Id. When the plaintiff's leg failed to heal properly, he sued the
hospital for malpractice. Id. at 432. Relying on the "trust fund theory," purportedly established
in Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846), and its progeny, Judge Devens
held that the hospital was immune from damages in tort. Id. at 435. Because the hospital received
its funding from donations and provided medical care to indigent persona without any expectation
of compensation, the hospital was a charity under the common law of Massachusetts. Id. at 434-35.
Judge Devens reasoned that '[where] there has been no neglect on the part of those who administer
[a] trust . . . and if due care has been used . . . in selection of [the trustees'] . . . agents, . . . [the
trust] cannot be made [liable]." Id. at 436.
Thus, the doctrine of charitable immunity was born. Maryland was the second state to adopt
the doctrine in Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885). See also Schopler, supra note 2, at
39-40; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1680; The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at
1383.
5. For a summary of modern case law and statutes concerning charitable immunity, see Janet
Fairchild, Annotation, Ton Immunity of Nongovernmental Charities - Modem Status, 25 A.L.R.
4th 517 (1983). See also Bradley C. Canon & Dean Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial
Doctrine: The Abrogation of Charitable Immunity, 13 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 969, 971 (1979);
Ronald M. Lipson, Charitable Immunity: The Plague of Modem Ton Concepts, 7 CLEV. MARSHALL
L. REV. 483, 484 (1958).
6. One reason enunciated for the doctrine is the "trust fund" theory. Under this theory, courts
argued that charities should be immune from paying damages in tort because charitable donations
were said to be held in trust for the beneficiaries of the charity, and paying tort judgments from
those funds would frustrate the intent of the donor. See, e.g., Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 75
N.E. 991, 993 (111. 1905); Cook v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 202 S.W. 874, 876 (Ky.
1918); Downs v. Harper Hosp., 60 N.W. 42, 43 (Mich. 1894). Another theory supporting
immunity was that charities were not bound by the doctrine of respondeat superior because charities
did not profit from their employees' work. See, e.g., Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 33 A. 595, 604
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During the 1940s and 1950s, the doctrine of charitable immunity fell into
disrepute because it was inconsistent with the principle that a tortfeasor should
bear responsibility for harm caused. 7 By 1985, almost every jurisdiction had
repudiated or substantially limited the doctrine." Among the reasons cited for
the demise of the doctrine of charitable immunity were the development of an
advanced insurance industry and the growth of the nonprofit sector.9 Courts
(Conn. 1895); Bachman v. Young Women's Christian Assoc., 191 N.W. 751, 752 (Wis. 1922).
Other courts held that the beneficiaries of charitable organizations impliedly waived liability of the
charity or assumed the risk by accepting the charities' largess. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Idaho Falls
Latter Day Saints Hosp., 82 P.2d 849, 853-54 (Idaho 1938); Averback v. Young Men's Christian
Assoc., 61 S.W.2d 1066, 1066-67 (Ky. 1933); Winslow v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Nat. Home,
44 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Mich. 1950); Adams v. University Hosp., 99 S.W. 453, 453-54 (Mo. App.
1907); Bruce v. Young Men's Christian Assoc., 277 P. 798, 802 (Nev. 1929). Yet other courts
opined that holding a charity liable in tort would deter charitable activity and donations, and
therefore they concluded that charities should not pay tort judgments for policy reasons. See, e.g.,
Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc., 154 A. 435, 436-37 (Conn. 1931).
See Fairchild, supra note 5, at 522-23; Schopler, supra note 2, at 57-73. See also
Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1680; The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1384.
7. The "death knell" of the doctrine of charitable immunity was President & Directors of
Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895E, cmt. b (1977) (citing Georgetown College as the seminal case rejecting the doctrine
of charitable immunity).
In Georgetown College, Judge Rutledge wrote a lengthy criticism of the doctrine of charitable
immunity stating that "the accidental character of the origin has been lost in the fog of later
decision." Georgetown College, 130 F.2d at 815. Judge Rutledge considered and rejected all of
the common law justifications for the doctrine of charitable immunity. Id. at 822-28. Judge
Rutledge concluded that charities should be liable in tort, as are private individuals, when they "[do]
good in the wrong way." Id. at 828.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E, cmts. b & c (1977); Fairchild, supra
note 5, at 527-28; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1680 n. 21; The Quality of Mercy,
supra note 3, at 1385. For a discussion of "the accidental character of the origin" of the doctrine
of charitable immunity, see supra note 3.
8. Case law and statutes representing the demise of charitable immunity are compiled in
CHARLES TREMPER, RECONSIDERING LEGAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE FOR NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 187-201 (1989). Some jurisdictions eliminated the doctrine by statute while others
did so by case law. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557(d) (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN tit. 14, § 158 (West 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85k (West 1985 & Supp.
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.9 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-26 (1956); Malloy v. Fong,
232 P.2d 241, 246-47 (Cal. 1951); Gubbe v. Catholic Diocese, 257 N.E.2d 239, 242 (Ill. Ct. App.
1970); Harris v. Young Women's Christian Assoc., 237 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 1968); Parker v.
Port Huron Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Mich. 1960); Benton v. Young Men's Christian Assoc., 141
A.2d 298, 299 (N.J. 1958); Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629, 630 ('ex. 1971).
See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1680. Contra, The Quality of Mercy,
supra note 3, at 1385 (arguing that reports of the abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity
are greatly exaggerated). See generally Fairchild, supra note 5 (outlining the modern status of
charitable immunity across jurisdictions).
9. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 1070-71; Charles Robert Tremper, Compensaionfor
Harm from Charitable Activity, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 402-11 (1991); Developments in the
Law, supra note 3, at 1681; The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1395; David Bush, The
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reasoned that any burden placed on charities because of tort liability could be
alleviated if charities purchased insurance.'0 Moreover, charities had evolved
from asset-poor organizations into substantial corporate powers with sufficient
assets to self-insure."
More recently, a trend toward affording charities greater immunity has re-
emerged.' This trend is the result of rising insurance premiums, the reduced
insurance coverage characteristic of the 1980s, 3 and several high-profile cases
Constitutionality of the Charitable Immunity and Liability Act of 1987, 40 BAYLOR L. REv. 657,
658-59 (1988).
10. See, e.g., President & Dirs. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Moore v. Moyle, 92 N.E. 2d 81, 84-85 (Ill. 1950) (rejecting charitable immunity on the
grounds, inter alia, that charities could obtain insurance to spread the loss incurred by a tort
judgment). See also Tremper, supra note 9, at 411; Lipson, supra note 5, at 495-96; Developments
in the Law, supra note 3, at 1681; The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1395 (discussing the
argument that charitable immunity should be abrogated because charities could simply purchase
insurance).
11. See, e.g., Noel v. Menninger Found., 267 P.2d 934, 942 (Kan. 1954). See also
Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1581; Bush, supra note 9, at 658-59. Cf. Henry B.
Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?,
39 CASE W. RES. L. RaV. 807, 812 (1988) [hereinafter Evolving Law] (outlining the development
of the nonprofit sector over the last 40 years); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835, 835 (1980) [hereinafter Nonprofit Enterprise]; James Cook,
Businessmen with Halos, FORBES, Nov. 26, 1990, at 100, 106 (discussing the economic growth and
power of the nonprofit sector).
Professor Hansmann observes that, prior to World War II, most non-profit organizations were
donatively supported and provided services that had the character of public goods. See Evolving
Law, supra, at 812. He adds that the nonprofit sector and non-profit organizations within that sector
were small. Id. However, today, the nonprofit sector has grown in size and economic power. See
Nonprofit Enterprise, supra, at 835. A new breed of nonprofit organizations (i.e., commercial
nonprofit organizations that engage in the sale of goods or services for a profit) has also emerged.
See Evolving Law, supra, at 813. While the nonprofit sector contributed only 5.9% to the gross
national product in 1973, see Nonprofit Enterprise, supra, at 836, nonprofit organizations were
responsible for 15 % of the gross national product and generated revenues exceeding $750 billion in
1987. Forbes, supra, at 100.
12. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 402-03; see Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1682-
84; The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1385-86.
13. A premium is simply the consideration for a contract of insurance. See, e.g., Bronson v.
Glander, 77 N.E.2d 471, 472 (Ohio 1948). See also JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN,
APPLEmAN ON INSURANCE § 7813 (1985); 2 COOLEY'S BRIEFS ON INSURANCE 1507 (1907).
Premiums are usually payable annually or at fixed intervals during the year. See APPLEMAN &
APPLEMAN, supra, at § 7831. 'Coverage" means the payments made by the insurer to the insured
when the insured makes a valid claim against an enforceable contract of insurance.
Professor Michael Singsen discussed the impact of the 1980s insurance crisis on non-profit
organizations in Comment, Charity Is No Defense: The Impact of the Insurance Crisis on Nonprofit
Organizations and an Examination ofAhemative Insurance Mechanisms, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 599,
601-09 (1988). Professor Singsen recounts several possible causes for the "hard" insurance market
of the 1980s. Id. at 601-04. He suggests that collusion among insurers and the "litigation
explosion" of the 1970s may be partially responsible for the unavailability of insurance in the 1980s.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 [1995], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss3/4
1995] BETIER TO GIVE THAN RECEIVE 1197
imposing enormous liability on nonprofit corporations. 4 However, legislatures
and courts generally disagree on the extent of liability that nonprofit corporations
should be forced to bear, and the law around the country is currently in a state
of disarray. "
Id. at 601-02. However, Professor Singsen seems to reject these contentions and places credence
in the "cyclical" nature of the insurance industry as the cause of the insurance crisis. Id. Simply
put, the insurance industry earns capital in two ways: underwriting profit (defined as the difference
between revenue from premiums and losses paid) and investment profit (defined as profit from
investing premiums in stocks, bonds, etc.). Id. at 601. When investment profits are high, insurers
are willing to reduce premiums, while, when investment profits are low, insurers raise their
premiums. Id. at 602. Therefore, the low profit from investments in the early 1980s caused
insurers to raise their premiums. Id.
Professor Singsen, citing FRED S. JAMES & Co., NONPROFITS AND LIABILITY INSURANCE:
THE CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF NONPROFITS, INC. RISK POOLING PROJECT 5 (1987), notes that
65 % of nonprofit corporations in California reported 50% increases in insurance premiums in 1986.
See Singsen, supra, at 604-05. Of those corporations, 38% experienced premium increases of 200%
or more. Id. at 605 (citing UNITED WAY OF CALIFORNIA LIABiUTY INSURANCE CRISIS ISSUE BRIEF
2 (1986)). Professor Singsen reports that 22% of nonprofits had their liability insurance canceled
or non-renewed between 1982 and 1987. See Singsen, supra, at 605.
14. See, e.g, Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of Am., 391 S.E.2d 322 (Va. 1990) (holding that a boy
who was molested by a troop leader was entitled to receive $45,000 dollars in compensation from
the local organization chapter); Gary Taylor, Goodwill Must Pay $5M in Murder by Parolee-
Employee, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1987, at 22; David Rohn, Pool Victims Settle: Girl Who Nearly
Drowned to Get $4000 a Month, WASH. POST, May 17, 1978, at A4 (settling lawsuit concerning
a girl who almost drowned in the club's pool for over $800,000 and lifetime payments). See also
Tremper, supra note 9, at 402-03; Singsen, supra note 13, at 600-09; Developments in the Law,
supra note 3, at 1680-81.
15. For example, four states have placed statutory caps on damage awards allowed against
certain non-profits. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85k (West 1985 & Supp. 1991) (setting
the damage cap at $20,000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:17(1) (Supp. 1991) (setting the damage
cap at $250,000 per victim per occurrence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-55-210 (Law. Co-op. 1990)
(setting the damage cap at $200,000); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84 (West Supp.
1989) (setting damage cap at $500,000 for each person, $1,000,000 for each occurrence of bodily
injury or death, and $100,000 for each occurrence of property damage). Two states have limited
recovery against a charity to the extent of a charity's liability insurance. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 158 (West 1980); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-312 (1989). Colorado and
Wyoming give complete immunity to organizations providing services free of charge. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-116 (West 1987); Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y of Am. v. Yepsen, 469 P.2d 409,
411-12 (Wyo. 1970). New Jersey, Virginia and Alabama completely bar suits brought by
beneficiaries of a charity. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987); Radosevic v. Virginia
Intermont College, 633 F. Supp. 1084, 1086-89 (W.D. Va. 1986) (applying Virginia law); Autry
v. Roebuck Park Baptist Church, 229 So. 2d 469, 473-74 (Ala. 1969). Utah grants immunity to
charities if the tortious injury complained of is caused by a volunteer's criminal activity. UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-19-1 to -3 (1987). Arkansas retains full immunity from tort judgments for
charities. Helton v. Sisters of Mercy of St. Joseph's Hosp., 351 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Ark 1961). In
Georgia and Tennessee, charitable assets and property cannot be levied on as a result of a tort
judgment. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 188 S.E.2d 915, 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972);
Hammond Post No. 3, Inc., Am. Legion v. Willis, 165 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tenn. 1942). See also
Tremper, supra note 9, at 411-12; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1682-84; The Quality
of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1385-86, 1391-94.
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For example, states have generally disagreed on the issue of whether
charities should pay punitive damages. 6 Fearing that large punitive damage
awards would debilitate the charitable sector, some states have placed caps on
the amount of an award that may be assessed against charities."7 Yet other
states have assessed punitive damage awards against charities regardless of their
charitable status.'" Five states have granted partial immunity or limited
liability to organizations that engage in charitable activity.'9 For example,
partial immunity or limited liability is based on the organization's tax exempt
status under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) in Maryland and Utah.' New
For a discussion of varying state rules regarding punitive damages with respect to charities,
see infra notes. 17-21 and accompanying text.
Another recent development has been the introduction and occasional enactment of several
statutes intended to protect charity and nonprofit volunteers from liability in tort. See, e.g.,
VOLUNTEER PROTECTION AcT OF 1989, H.R. 911, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Several reasons
are given for this movement, including former President Bush's" 1000 Points of Light" program and
concerns that volunteers will quit volunteering if they are held liable for their torts. See Tremper,
supra note 9, at 402-03; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1685-89. However, this note
is concerned mainly with the liability of charities, not volunteers, and therefore, a discussion of the
immunity of volunteers is beyond the scope of this note.
16. See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 237, § 85k (West 1985 & Supp. 1991); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 508:17(11) (Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-55-210 (Law Co-op. 1990); TEx.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.006 (West Supp. 1989).
18. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Assoc., 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982)
(applying the Federal Fair Housing Act); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482
N.W.2d 806, 809-10 (Minn. 1992) (allowing punitive damages to be assessed against a catholic
church where a priest molested a young male parishioner); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology
of Portland, 644 P.2d 577, 607-08 (Or. 1982) (allowing punitive damages against a church where
the church depleted the parishioners' assets by fraud), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983). For a
discussion of other jurisdictions that have allowed large punitive damage awards to be assessed
against charities, see the authorities cited at supra note 14.
19. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 158 (West 1980) (setting maximum recovery
against charities at the amount of the charities' insurance coverage); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231, § 85k (West 1985 & Supp 1991) (setting the damage cap at $20,000 per occurrence); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-55-210 (Law Co-op. 1990) (setting the damage cap at $200,000); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84 (West 1989) (setting the damage cap at $500,000 for each person,
$1,000,000 for each occurrence of bodily injury or death, and $100,000 for each occurrence of
property damage).
20. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-312(a)(5) (1994); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-19-1 to -3 (1994).
In order to qualify for tax exemption under I.R.C. §501(c)(3), an organization must, inter alia,
have a charitable purpose, operate in harmony with the public interest, serve a sufficiently broad
public, and adhere to the nondistribution constraint. See Bob Jones University v. United States 461
U.S. 574 (1982). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) lists certain activities of an organization which are considered
for tax exemption if the organization meets the other requirements of § 501(c)(3). These activities
include religious, scientific, fiterary, and educational activities as well as testing for public safety,
fostering sports competition, or prevention of cruelty to children or animals. See also infra notes
320-31 and accompanying text.
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Hampshire, however, protects all nonprofit organizations from full liability. 2'
The debate over whether charities and nonprofit corporations should pay
punitive damages is based on both the policy behind, and the practical effect of,
a punitive damage award.' First, the general concern is that awarding
punitive damages against charities will reduce their ability to produce benefits
for the public.' Although punitive damage awards arguably deter charities
from committing torts in the future,' punitive damage awards may also deter
charities from engaging in charitable activities.' Second, there is little
justification for taking money from the charitable sector and placing it in the
hands of a private plaintiff.' Such a transfer is likely to result in reduced
assets in the charitable sector and, consequently, a reduction in charitable
21. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:17 (Supp. 1991) (setting the damage cap at $250,000 per
person and $1,000,000 per occurrence in suits against all organizations with I.R.C. § 501(c) status).
22. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1682; The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3,
at 1386-98; Michelle Berdinis Fagin, Note, Punitive Damages and Nonprofit Corporations: To
Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 377, 377-79, 387-90 (1985). See generally
Tremper, supra note 9.
23. There is some anecdotal evidence that suggests that such over-deterrence actually occurs
when punitive damage awards are imposed on charities. See, e.g., Insurance Increase Forces YMCA
to Drop Youth Minibike Program, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 1986, at 5; Kenneth Reich,
Youth Agencies Hit Hard by Soaring Insurance Costs, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1986, Part II, at I. See
also Tremper, supra note 9, at 425-30; Fagin, supra note 22, at 389-90; Developments in the Law,
supra note 3, at 1691-92.
24. The assumption that punitive damage awards deter charities from committing torts has not
gone unchallenged. See, e.g., Tremper, supra note 9, at 425-30; Fagin, supra note 22, at 377-78.
In fact, it has been argued that imposing punitive damages on corporations for the torts of their
employees has no deterrent effect at all, regardless of whether the corporations are for profit or not-
for-profit. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909, cmt. b (1977); E. Donald Elliot,
Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Conduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1053, 1057
(1989). But see, e.g., Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1041 (1991) (holding that
a state could rationally conclude that imposing punitive damages on corporations for the torts of their
employees prevents tortious conduct).
25. Professor Tremper argues that over-deterrence can occur in a number of ways. See
Tremper, supra note 9, at 427-33. He first suggests that charities will be overcautious and will
"remain far from the danger zone of liability." Id. at 427. In contrast, Professor Tremper also
argues that charities may walk a "tightrope" near liability because many charities are willing to
accept the abnormal risk of working with dangerous populations. Id. Professor Tremper concludes
that charities will behave this way because they are unresponsive to the economic cues of tort law.
Id. at 426-28. In addition, Professor Tremper argues that the charitable sector's inability to obtain
insurance may also result in deterrence of charitable activities. Id. at 428, 430-33. See also
Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1682, 1690-93.
26. ()' Bass v, Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877) ("[lIt is difficult to understand
why, if the tortfeasor is to be exemplary by punitive damages, they should go to the compensated
sufferer, and not to the public on whose behalf he is punished.") (opinion of Ryan, C.J.).
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In contrast, if punitive damages are not awarded against charities, tortious
conduct will remain undeterred.' Moreover, an award of punitive damages
makes a social statement that the defendant's egregious conduct is not acceptable
in an ordered society." If punitive damages are not awarded against charities,
there is a danger that immunity from punitive damages will be viewed as social
acquiescence to wrongful conduct so long as that conduct occurs in the name of
charity.3
This Note is not intended to re-open the debate over whether charities
should be completely immune from tort judgments. That subject has been
discussed elsewhere. 3' Even staunch supporters of charitable immunity
recognize that complete immunity is not a preferable solution to the economic
dilemma from potential liability in tort that charities face.32
This Note intends to explore the issue of whether charities and nonprofit
corporations should pay punitive damages. 3  This Note argues that
jurisdictions that allow the assessment of punitive damage awards to be assessed
against charities run the risk of depleting the charitable sector's assets, deterring
27. See, e.g., Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F.2d 869, 873 (4th Cir.
1929):
mhe exemption of public charities from liability ... rests . .. upon [the] grounds of
public policy, which forbids the crippling or destruction of charities which are
established for the benefit of the whole public .... The law has always favored and
fostered public charities in ways too numerous to mention, because they are most
valuable adjuncts of the state in the promotion of many of the purposes for which the
state exists.
Id.
See also Tremper, supra note 9, at 439; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1683.
At least one state has attempted to deal with the problem of over-deterrence. See Volnteer
Protection Act, 1991 Ala. Acts 439.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 97-111.
29. See infra notes 256 and 258 and sources cited therein.
30. See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 32 and sources cited therein.
32. For a strong argument against charitable immunity, see The OQ/ity of Mercy, supra note
3, at 1386-99. But cf. Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1691-96; Tremper, supra note 9,
at 444-66 (arguing in favor of limited immunity for charities while recognizing that there should be
exceptions to complete immunity to prevent the injustice that arises from denying at least some
recovery to a tort victim).
33. It should be noted that the issue of whether charities should be completely immune from
tort judgments is highly related to the issue of whether a charity should pay punitive damages.
Obviously, if a charity is completely immune from suit, it will not pay punitive damages either. In
fact, many of the arguments in favor of complete immunity, outlined in supra note 6, are the same
arguments that commentators make when arguing that charities should not pay punitive damages.
See, e.g., infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
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charitable activity, and punishing innocent donors and beneficiaries.' Such a
depletion of charitable assets deprives society of the public benefits that would
have otherwise been produced had the assets remained in the hands of
charities." However, this Note also argues that limited liability for charities
will result in the undesirable effect of allowing tortious conduct on the part of
charities to remain undeterred.'
In order to accomplish the deterrence of tortious conduct on the part of
individual charities while preventing the economic ruin of charitable activity in
the aggregate, this Note argues that a compromise must be struck between
holding charities completely liable for punitive damage awards and allowing
charities limited liability." In order to accomplish such a compromise, this
Note proposes a model statute that allows for an award of punitive damages
against charities, but which provides that the award be split between the plaintiff
and a charity providing a similar benefit to the public.' This Note argues that
such a statute will deter tortious conduct on the part of the individual charity
while insuring that the charitable assets remain, for the most part, in the
charitable sector." Thus, the deterrence of tortious conduct will be achieved
while protecting the economic vitality of the charitable sector.'
As an analytic framework, this Note will briefly outline the scope of the
nonprofit and charitable sectors in Section I.41 The nature and purpose of
punitive damages will be discussed in Section Hl. ' This Note will then outline
the traditional arguments made as to the issue of whether charities and nonprofit
corporations should pay punitive damages in Section IV.' A few proposals
for reform in the law of punitive damages as applied to nonprofit corporations
34. See infra notes 173-244 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 245-53 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 254-58 adn accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 314-43 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 314-43 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 314-43 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 314-43 and accompanying text.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 50-64.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 65-76.
43. See infr-a text accompanying notes 77-258. The arguments traditionally made against
awarding punitive damages against charities and nonprofit corporations are that nonprofit
organizations and charities are not responsible for the acts of their employees and volunteers, and
therefoke, should not be punished; charities and nonprofit corporations are not wealth maximizing
organizations, and therefore, will not respond to the economic cues of tort law; imposing punitive
damages on these organizations punishes innocent beneficiaries and donors; and holding charities
and nonprofit corporations liable for punitive damages will deprive society of benefits that would
have otherwise been produced by these organizations if the money had been left in the nonprofit
sector. See infra notes 77-258 and accompanying text.
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and charities will be surveyed in Section V.' A proposal for allowing
complete liability against nonprofit organizations that engage in the production
of private benefits and commercial activitiesA will be made in Section VI.46
In Section VI, this Note also will argue that charitable organizations providing
public benefits should receive special treatment under tort law.47 To that end,
44. See infra text accompanying notes 259-312. Some of the proposals that have been made
are Professor Tremper's "charitable redress system," placing caps on the amount of damages that
can be obtained against charities and nonprofit corporations, and subsidizing charities through
government funding. See infra notes 259-312 and accompanying text.
45. "Commercial Activities," as used in this note, means the sale of goods or services for a
price. Consequently, "commercial nonprofit corporations," as used in this note, means those
nonprofit corporations that engage in the sale of goods or services as their primary activity and
derive nearly all of their income from the prices charged for the goods or services. See Evolving
Law, supra note 11, at 813. 'Private benefits," as used in this note, means those goods or services
which benefit only the purchaser. See Developmens in the Law, supra note 3, at 1585. Private
clubs and mutual benefit associations are good examples of nonprofit corporations that produce
private benefits because only the club members derive the benefit from the clubs' facilities and
services. See Evolving Law, supra note 11, at 809.
For an in-depth discussion of the difference between "public benefits" and "private benefits"
as used in this note, see infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. However, for the time being, to
understand the difference between nonprofit organizations that produce 'public benefits" and
nonprofit organizations that produce "private benefits" as used in this note, it is useful here to
consider the example given by Professors William A. Klien and Joseph Bankman. Professors Klien
and Bankman write:
Consider, for example, the fee structure at one [nonprofit] west coast opera company.
The nominal cost of one "Series A" box seat is $1,585. However, such seats are
available after a major donation. The amount of donation that will secure such a box
is said to be $20,000 - down from $100,000 in the more prosperous 1980s. In addition,
holders of Series A boxes are requested to make a minimum contribution of $4500 a
year.
WILLIAM A. KUEN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, INDIviDUAL TAXATION 498 n.2 (10th ed. 1994).
Hypothetically, one could argue that the West Coast Opera company described by Professors
Klien and Bankman produces a "public benefit" by insuring the development of the arts in the
community where the opera company is located. However, the opera company produces a "private
benefit" in that only those who can afford to buy a ticket are given the opportunity to enjoy the
services that the opera company provides. The opera company appears to be more like an exclusive,
private club rather than an organization concerned about the development of the community. In
addition, it appears that any benefit that the opera company produces could be produced equally well
by a for-profit organization. See KLIEN & BANKMAN, supra at 498 n.2.
It can be supposed that a myriad of nonprofit organizations, such as the West Coast Opera
company described above, produce only private benefits and yet receive the benefits of nonprofit
status under I.R.C. § 501(c). An exhaustive listing of such organizations would be superfluous for
the proposes of this note. For the sake of simplicity only, mutual benefit associations and private
clubs shall be used throughout this note as examples of nonprofit organizations that engage in the
production of only private benefits.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 313-43.
47. This note will argue that the concept of organizations that confer public benefits is
encompassed by §501(c)(3) status, and that a special rle concerning punitive damages should be
crafted to protect the class of organizations that meet the criteria of §501(c)(3). See infra text
accompanying notes 313-43.
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Section VI will propose a model statute that provides for splitting a punitive
damages award between the plaintiff and a charity that provides a similar benefit
to society as the organization sued.4' The constitutionality of this proposal will
be discussed in Section VII.9
II. THE Nar-FOR-POFrr SEcToR
Prior to 1950, most nonprofit corporations were charities and could be
considered as a unitary class." Most nonprofit organizations, before World
War II, were traditional charities that were supported by donations, and these
charities provided services for a substantial segment of the public."' Today,
however, the nonprofit sector not only includes traditional charities such as
churches, soup kitchens, hospitals, the American Red Cross, and the Salvation
Army, but also encompasses the National Football League, the Sierra Club, the
Girl Scouts of America, the National Geographic Society, the Federalist Society,
and tie Ku Klux Klan.52
Nonprofit organizations, such as an exclusive men's club,53 may be
formed to produce a private benefit.' Yet other nonprofit organizations, such
as the American Red Cross, may be formed to produce a public benefit. 5
Nonprofit organizations, such as Valparaiso University, may also produce both
48. See infra text accompanying notes 313-43.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 344-78.
50. For a discussion of changes in the nonprofit sector from 1950 to the present, see supra note
11 and sources cited therein.
51. See supra note 11 and sources cited therein. Professor Hansmann cites nonprofit hospitals
as a particularly conspicuous example of how charities and nonprofit corporations have changed over
the last 40 years. See Evolving Law, supra note 11, at 813. Professor Hansmann notes that until
the end of the 19th century, hospitals provided health care almost exclusively for the poor, while
the rich were treated in their own homes. Id. Today, however, most hospitals provide services on
a "fee-for-service" basis and do little to subsidize medical care for the poor. Id. Yet, over 75%
of hospitals are still nonprofit corporations. Id. at 813-14.
52. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1581 (discussing various examples of
nonprofit corporations and charities).
53. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1585. The benefits of a private country club
inure solely to the benefit of its members, and therefore, the club produces a private benefit. For
a discussion of private and public benefits, see infra note 54.
54. The terms public and private benefits are not meant to be construed as analogous to
economic terms of art (e.g., public goods and private goods). "Private benefits" indicate goods and
services that can be used only by the consumer. "Public benefits" indicate goods and services that
can be used by the consumer as well as by others.
55. For example, the American Red Cross provides public benefits by providing relief to the
public at large in times of disaster. The Red Cross does so regardless of whether beneficiaries have
paid for the relief. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 61 (1981).
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public and private benefits.'
In addition, the nonprofit sector has also become populated with
organizations that sell personal services as their primary activity and which
derive nearly all of their income from the price charged for those services.5"
The nonprofit sector generates more than $750 billion in revenues each year,
totalling approximately fifteen percent of the gross national product.'
Thus, while nonprofit corporations can incorporate for any purpose," the
nonprofit status of a corporation depends mainly on its adherence to the
nondistribution constraint in its corporate charter. '
The nondistribution constraint prevents nonprofit organizations from
distributing their assets to third parties, such as shareholders, thereby attempting
to force nonprofit organizations to use their assets to produce a better good or
service.6 The nondistribution constraint, however, does not prevent nonprofit
56. See VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY CORPORATE CHARTER (on file at Valparaiso University Office
of Vice President of Business Affairs) (providing that the University's assets shall not inure to the
benefit of third parties). Universities contribute to a more educated citizenry, thereby producing
public benefits. Universities, however, also provide an education to the individual students which
is a private benefit to those students. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1581
(discussing the nonprofit status of Harvard University).
57. For a discussion of the development of commercial nonprofit corporations, see supra note
11.
58. For a discussion of the economic power and growth of the nonprofit sector from 1950 to
the present, see supra note 11.
59. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-17-4-1 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-2-213(2)(a)
(1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.03 (Baldwin 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1005 B.
(West 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-52-102(9)(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1994); REVISED MODEL
NONPROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 2.02 (1988). But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805 pars. 1051 102.10
(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing that a nonprofit corporation may only be formed for the
purposes enumerated in the statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 4 (West 1987 & Supp.
1994) (same). See also Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 839; Developments in the Law,
supra note 3, at 1582. It should also be noted that states once limited the purposes for which
nonprofits could be formed, but the trend is toward removing these restrictions. See Howard L.
Oleck, Propretary Mentality and the New Non-Profit Corporation Laws, 20 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 145
(1971). See also Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 839; Developments in the Law, supra note
3, at 1582 n.8.
60. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-17-21-1 (West 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, pars. 106.05 (Smith-Hurd 1991); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT
CORPORATION LAW, §§ 1.40, 13.01 (1988). See also Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 838-
39; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1582.
61. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(West 1994). See also Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11,
at 838; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1582.
Professor Hansmann argues that consumers are more likely to deal with nonprofit
organizations when consumers are unable to evaluate the quality of goods or services purchased.
See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 843-45. Consumers are more likely to deal with non-
profit organizations in this situation because such organizations are more likely to commit their funds
to producing better quality goods and services and are less able, as a result of the nondistribution
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corporations from earning a profit or accumulating net profits.' Moreover,
nonprofit corporations cannot defy the laws of economics: nonprofit
organizations must generate enough revenue to cover their expenditures.'
Therefore, while nonprofit organizations may generate more revenue than
needed to meet their expenses, that profit accumulates in their corporate
treasuries because the profit cannot be distributed to third parties. Before
discussing whether punitive damages should be awarded against nonprofit
corporations and charities, a brief discussion of punitive damages is
necessary."
Having discussed the structure of the nonprofit sector, the next section will
discuss the nature and purpose of punitive damages. A brief discussion of
punitive damages is necessary before reaching the issue of whether charities and
nonprofit organizations should be subjected to punitive damages. After
discussing punitive damages, this Note will address the arguments on both sides
of the issue of whether charities and nonprofit organizations should be subjected
to punitive damage awards.
III. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF PUNrrIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages are imposed to punish a tortfeasor for past wrongs. 65
In addition, punitive damage awards presumably deter civil defendants and
constraint, to exploit consumers by gaining greater shareholder profits than for-profit firms. Id. See
also Henry B. Hansmann, Consumer Perceptions of Nonprofit Enterprise: Reply, 90 YALE LJ. 1633
(1981) (arguing that empirical data supports this theory of nonprofit corporations). But cf. Steven
E. Permut, Consumer Perceptions of Nonprofit Enterprise: A Comment on Hansmann, 90 YALE L.J.
1623, 1623-32 (1981) (arguing that empirical data does not support Professor Hansmann's theory).
62. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 838; Developments in the Law, supra note 3,
at 1582. In fact, some state nonprofit incorporation statutes explicitly allow nonprofits to earn a
profit so long as profits are not distributed to third parties. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-7-1.1-
4(c) (West 1979), repealed by P.L. 179-1991 § 34 (1991).
63. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 880. See also Developments in the Law, supra
note 3, at 1582 n.10 (discussing Professor Hansmann's model of the nonprofit sector).
64. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 838. By saying that profits accumulate in the
nonprofit corporations' corporate treasuries, this is not to say that the money will never be used.
Id. Nonprofit corporations may use the excess profit to produce more goods and services and to pay
their employees. Id. But because of the nondistribution constraint, they may not distribute profits
to shareholders or other third parties. Id. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1582
n.10.
65. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 908 & cmt. a. (1979); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Damages
§ 733 at 785 (1988); KENNETH R. REDDEN & LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNrrIVE DAMAGES § 2.2,
at 24 (2d ed. 1989); Robert W. McMenamin, Should the Non-Profits Pay Punitive Damages?, NAT.
L.J., Mar. 8, 1993, at 17.
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others from engaging in tortious conduct in the future.' Punitive damages are
presumed to produce a public benefit by ensuring that public order is maintained
through the deterrent function of the award.' However, whether punitive
damages actually inure to the benefit of the public is highly debated.'
In addition to the retributive and deterrent functions of a punitive damage
award, advocates of punitive damages argue that such awards provide plaintiffs
with an incentive to prosecute conduct that is technically punishable under the
criminal law, but not serious enough to come to the attention of the state
prosecutor.' This principle, under which a plaintiff is encouraged to prosecute
egregious conduct by the prospect of receiving a punitive damage award, is
known as the private attorney general theory2m  In contrast, opponents of
66. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(l) and cmt. a. (1979). See also Lynda
A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive
Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 473, 474 (1993); Fagin, supra note 22, at 377; McMenamin, supra
note 65, at 19.
Punitive damages are different from nominal and compensatory damages. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). Nominal damages entail an award of a small amount of money
to signify that a plaintiff's legal right has been violated. See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§
2, 11 at 33, 40 (1988). Compensatory damages are awarded to put the plaintiff back in the position
that the plaintiff would have been in had the plaintiff not been injured. See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Damages § 26 at 52-54 (1988).
There is some authority for the proposition that punitive damages are compensatory in nature
and merely have an incidental punishing effect. See, e.g., 25 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 735 at 788
(1988). According to this view, punitive damages compensate for intangible losses, such as
emotional distress, humiliation, insult, or vexation, which arise from malicious wrongs. Id.
However, this function of punitive damages has diminished with the development of awards for pain
and suffering, mental distress, and hedonic damages. Id. See also Sloane, supra, at 481-82.
67. Punitive damages can maintain the public order in a number of ways. For example, the
defendant will be less likely to engage in similar conduct in the future, fearing future liability.
Punitive damages also maintain the public order by allowing the plaintiff to get even with the
defendant without resort to violence. See Winkler v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 168 A.2d 418,
422 (N.J. Super. 1961), cited in Sloane, supra note 66, at 480 ("[Punitive] damages are allowed
... to vindicate the rights of a party in substitution for personal revenge, thus safeguarding the
public peace.").
68. For a brief outline of the debate over the propriety and utility of punitive damages, see infra
text accompanying notes 69-71.
69. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, Damages § 77, at 276
(1935); Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Report of the ARA Action Commission to Improve the Tort
Liability System, ABA 1987 MIDYEAR MEETINO, Feb. 16-17, 1987, at 16, cited in Sloane, supra
note 66, at 476 n.17.
70. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1358 (Me. 1985) (awarding punitive
damages to enforce society's rules); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454, 461
(Miss. 1983) (holding that an award of punitive damages to plaintiffs should be reserved for cases
where the plaintiff has put forth "great trouble and personal expense"); Kink v. Combs, 135
N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965) (awarding punitive damages to plaintiff gives plaintiff an incentive to
pursue a claim that would punish and deter socially harmful conduct). But cf Clarence Morris,
Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1178 (1931), cited in Sloane, supra note
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punitive damage awards argue that plaintiffs, who have presumably been made
whole by compensatory damages, receive a "windfall" when they are awarded
punitive damages. 7'
One changing area of the law of punitive damages is the degree of
culpability that is necessary to justify an award of punitive damages. At
common law, the defendant must have acted willfully or maliciously for punitive
damages to be imposed. 2 Today, however, most states allow awards of
punitive damages where the defendant's conduct rises only to the level of mere
recklessness. 73
Another changing area in the law of punitive damages is whether
organizations should pay punitive damages based on the torts of their employees
or volunteers under the doctrine of respondeat superior.74 Some states hold
that organizations are fully liable for the torts of their employees or members,
including liability for punitive damages, regardless of the culpability of the
66, at 481 n.47 (arguing that plaintiffs are not interested in prosecuting outrageous conduct for the
benefit of the public, rather plaintiffs are motivated to present inflammatory evidence to the jury in
order to increase the amount of the award). For a more in-depth discussion of the history of
punitive damages, see Sloane, supra note 66, at 479-82.
71. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981) (describing the plaintiff's
"unpredictable and, at times, substantial windfall"); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Arkansas Sheriff's
Boy's Ranch, 655 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (denying punitive damages because plaintiff would receive
a windfall); Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654 (1877) (same). For an in-depth
discussion of the windfall that the plaintiff receives as a result of being awarded punitive damages,
see Sloane, supra note 66, at 479-81.
72. See KEErTON ET AL., supra note 2, § 2, at 8. See also Martin A. Kotler, Motivation and
Tort Law: Acting for Economic Gain as a Suspect Motive, 41 VAND. L. REv. 63, 88 (1988)
(discussing the policies underlying punitive damages).
73. See, e.g., Hazelwood v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1205 (Il. App. Ct.
1983) (allowing punitive damages where defendant acted with conscious disregard for the safety of
others); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186-87 (Utah 1983) (allowing
punitive damages where the defendant's conduct rises to the level of reckless disregard for the rights
of others). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, cmt. c (1977) (holding that punitive
damages are allowable where the defendant's conduct rises to the level of recklessness). But cf.
Como Oil Co. v. O'Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1985) (allowing punitive damages only
where the defendant's conduct is willful or wanton).
Although recklessness is somewhat difficult to define, one formulation is that recklessness can
be found where a defendant acts with a conscious indifference to the consequences of his or her
actions. See KEErON ELr AL., supra note 2, § 2 at 10. Another change in the law of punitive
damages is the elevation of the burden of proof in a majority of states to a "clear and convincing"
standard. See Sloane, supra note 66, at 483.
74. The doctrine of respondeat superior provides that a master is liable for the torts of his or
her servants. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 909 (6th ed. 1991); 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and
Servant § 404 at 410-11 (1970); 3 AM. JUR. 2DAgency § 280 at 782-83 (1986).
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organization.75 Other states hold that an organization is not liable for punitive
damages resulting from the tortious conduct of the organization's employees or
members unless the tortious act of the employee or member was ratified or
authorized by the organization or unless the organization bore some degree of
culpability in relation to the tortious act.
76
IV. SHOULD NONPROFrr ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITIES
PAY PuNrrvE DAMAGES?
The question of whether nonprofit corporations and charities should pay
punitive damages has received relatively little attention by commentators.
However, various arguments can be made in favor of exempting nonprofit
organizations and charities from punitive damage awards.' The various
arguments on both sides of the issue will be discussed in the following sections.
C
A. Punitive Damages Do Not Deter Nonprofit Organizations and Charities
Those who advocate exempting nonprofit organizations and charities from
punitive damages argue that punitive damage awards do not deter tortious
conduct in the nonprofit sector.' 8 Proponents of the nonprofit sector attempt
to justify this argument by relying on both the doctrine of respondeat superior'
and the economic analysis of law.' The following sections will address and
75. See Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn, 452 P.2d 117, 119 (Ariz. 1969); Standard Oil Co.
v. Gunn, 176 So. 332, 334 (Ala. 1937); Miller v. Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Ark. 1948);
American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Farmer, 48 S.E.2d 122, 131-32 (Ga. 1948); Northrp v. Miles
Homes, Inc. of Iowa, 204 N.W.2d 850, 858-59 (Iowa 1973); D. L. Fair Lumber Co. v. Weems,
16 So.2d 770, 773 (Miss. 1944); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 669 (Mo. App.
1978); Schmidt v. Minor, 184 N.W. 964, 965-66 (Minn. 1921); Clemons v. Life Ins. Co., 163
S.E.2d 761, 767 (N.C. 1968); Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1975);
Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526, 533 (Tenn. 1974).
76. See, e.g., CAL. Clv. CODE § 3294(b) (West Supp. 1984); Roginsby v. Richardson, 378
F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir. 1967) (applying New York law). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs
§ 909 (1977) also adheres to the view that punitive damages may be imposed on a principal for the
acts of its agents only where the principal ratified or authorized the acts of its agents. Id.
77. Some authors ignore distinctions between nonprofits and charities. See generally Fagin,
supra note 22 (arguing that nonprofit organizations should be exempt from punitive damages, except
in limited circumstances). But see Tremper, supra note 9, at 409, 459 (arguing that only certain
nonprofit organizations should be protected from full tort liability).
78. See Tramper, supra note 9, at 425-28, 449. See also Fagin, supra note 22, at 387-88
(arguing that imposing punitive damages on nonprofit corporations on the basis of respondeat
superior is not justifiable because the corporations are not culpable where the act of the employee
or volunteer is not ratified by the corporation).
79. For a discussion of the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to nonprofit
corporations and charities, see infra text accompanying notes 82-96.
80. For a discussion of the application of economic principles of tort law to nonprofit
corporations and charities, see infra text accompanying notes 97-128.
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attempt to refute these arguments separately. 8'
1. Respondeat Superior
Some proponents of the nonprofit sector have argued that when tortious acts
are committed by volunteers or employees of nonprofit organizations or
charities, the deterrent effects of awarding punitive damages against nonprofit
organizations and charities may not be achieved unless the charities and
nonprofit organizations are also guilty of culpable conduct.' If the charities
and nonprofit organizations must pay the punitive damage award but are not
guilty of any wrongdoing, it is argued that the award punishes the innocent
organizations rather than the guilty employee or volunteer." Proponents of
nonprofit organizations argue that if the punitive damage award punishes
innocent organizations, the deterrent effect of the punitive damage award will
not be realized.s 4
One difficulty with this argument is that it provides no reason why
nonprofit organizations or charities deserve different treatment than for-profit
corporations." If for-profit corporations must pay punitive damages because
of the tortious conduct of their employees, it could be argued that the innocent
corporations, rather than the culpable employees, are punished.s" Under this
rationale, both for-profit and nonprofit corporations should be equally exempt
from punitive damage awards where the tortious conduct was not ratified or
encouraged by the organization.' Therefore, the argument that imposing
punitive damages on corporations for the acts of their employees punishes
innocent corporations rather than the guilty employees can be made with respect
81. See infra notes 82-128 and accompanying text.
82. See Fagin, supra note 22, at 388. See also Tremper, supra note 9, at 449 (arguing that.
only certain nonprofit corporations should be exempt from punitive damage awards).
83. See Fagin, supra note 22, at 387-88.
84. Id.
85. For a brief discussion of how awarding punitive damages against corporations on the basis
of respondeat superior punishes "innocent" corporations, regardless of whether the corporation is
for-profit or nonprofit, see infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Tolle v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines Inc., 356 N.E.2d 625, 626 (111. App. Ct.
1976) ("[A]n assessment of punitive damages is more difficult to justify where an otherwise innocent
principal is held liable solely on the basis of [riespondeat superior.").
87. Howbver, a majority of courts hold that corporations are responsible for the acts of their
employees and should be held liable for punitive damages for the tortious acts of their employees.
See supra notes 75-76 and sources cited therein. This note takes the position that corporations,
whether they are for-profit or nonprofit, are responsible for the acts of their employees because
corporations can implement better risk management techniques to prevent employees from engaging
in harmful behavior, regardless of whether the organization is for-profit or nonprofit. See infra
notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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to both for-profit and nonprofit organizations.'
In response, proponents of the nonprofit sector argue that there is a
difference between for-profit corporations, nonprofit corporations, and charities,
and that nonprofit corporations and charities should not be held liable for
punitive damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior, while for-profit
corporations should be held liable." Proponents of the nonprofit sector argue
that the doctrine of respondeat superior rests upon the policy that when an
enterprise is carried on for one's own financial benefit, the one who receives the
financial benefit from that enterprise should answer for the torts committed by
one's servants in the course of achieving that financial benefit.' For-profit
corporations gain profit from the services of their employees and thus, fit
squarely within the rationale for the doctrine of respondeat superior.9' On the
other hand, charities and nonprofit organizations do not receive a financial
benefit from the activities in which they engage, and therefore, should not be
liable for punitive damages resulting from the torts of their servants under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.92
However, courts have generally rejected this narrow view of the doctrine
of respondeat superior.9" Courts have noted that while the justification for the
doctrine of respondeat superior is based in part on whether organizations profit
from their servants, the doctrine is also based on the fact that employers have
the ability to exercise authority and control over their employees." While a
88. See Fagin, supra note 22, at 391 (arguing that nonprofit organizations should not be liable
for punitive damages unless the act of the employee was ratified or encouraged by the organization
or unless the corporation is a sham).
89. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Crossett Health Ctr. v. Croswell, 256 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Ark. 1953); Hearns
v. Waterbury Hosp., 33 A. 595, 604 (Conn. 1895); Heffelfinger v. Morristown, 507 A.2d 761,
767 (N.J. Super. 1985); Peden v. Furman Univ., 151 S.E. 907, 911 (S.C. 1930); Schumacherv.
Evangelical Deaconess Soc. of Wis., 260 N.W. 476, 477 (Wis. 1935). See also 53 AM. JuR. 2D
Master and Servant § 417, at 431-32 (1970); Schopler, supra note 2, at 65-66.
91. See supra note 90 and sources cited therein.
92. See, e.g., Hears v. Waterbury Hosp., 33 A. 595, 604 (Conn. 1895) ('fhe defendant]
derives no [profit] from what its servants [do], in the sense of that personal and private gain which
was the real reason for the rule [of respondeat superior] ... [It] does not come within the [rule] of
public policy which supports the doctrine.. . ."). See also Bachman v. Young Women's Christian
Assoc., 191 N.W. 751, 752 (Wis. 1922); Crossett Health Ctr. v. Croswell, 256 S.W.2d 548, 550
(Ark. 1953); Peden v. Furman Univ., 151 S.E. 907, 911 (S.C. 1930). For a general discussion
of the doctrine of respondeat superior, see 53 AM. JuR. 2D Master and Servant § 417, at 431-32
(1970). See also 15 AM. JuR. 2D Charides § 202 at 245-47 (1976) (discussing the application of
the doctrine of respondeat superior to charitable organizations).
93. See supra note 90 and sources cited therein.
94. See supra note 90 and sources cited therein. See also 53 AM. JuR. 2D Master and Servant
§ 417 at 431-32 (1970) (discussing generally the policies underlying the doctrine of respondeat
superior).
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punitive damage award against a for-profit corporation under the doctrine of
respondeat superior makes the corporation answer for the torts committed by the
corporation's employees in the course of achieving a financial benefit for the
corporation, the punitive damage award also punishes careless employee
selection and hiring, prevents ineffective employee training, and deters
ineffective employee supervision." Similarly, punitive damage awards against
nonprofit organizations and charities would not punish innocent charities or
nonprofit organizations but would encourage implementation of similar employee
and member selection, training, and supervision programs." Because punitive
damage awards against charities and nonprofit organizations are likely to
encourage implementation of employee selection, training, and supervision
programs, charities and nonprofit organizations should be held liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the acts of their employees or members.
2. Economic Analysis of Law
Those who advocate exempting nonprofit organizations and charities from
punitive damages also argue that awarding punitive damages against nonprofit
organizations and charities may have little, if any, deterrent effect because
nonprofit organizations and charities do not respond well to the tort system's
economic cues." According to economists, tort law promotes economic
efficiency through the imposition of damages.' Economists assume that
tortfeasors will engage in harmful conduct only when the benefits to be gained
from the conduct outweigh the costs of the harmful conduct." When the law
95. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, II1 S. Ct. 1032, 1041 (1991) (applying
Alabama law and holding that imposing punitive damages on an employer for the tortious acts of
an employee does not violate the fundamental fairness required by the Due Process Clause). In the
course of the Court's opinion, Justice Blackmun reasoned that "[i]mposing exemplary damages on
the corporation . . . creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position to 'guard
substantially against the evil to be prevented." Id. (quoting Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell,
274 U.S. 112 (1927)). The Court further stated that a corporation would have an incentive to
minimize oversight of its agents if the corporation were liable only upon a showing that it was
independently at fault. Id.
96. Like the imposition of punitive damages on for-profit corporations, the imposition of
punitive damages on nonprofit corporations will create "a strong incentive for vigilance' on the part
of nonprofit corporations to prevent their employees and volunteers from engaging in tortious
activity. Cf Haslip, 111 S.Ct. at 1041. Moreover, if nonprofit corporations were liable only when
they are at fault independently, they would have "an incentive to minimize oversight of [their]
agents." Id.
97. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 426-28. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3,
at 1692 (arguing that standard tort rules may over-deter nonprofit corporations and drive these
corporations out of business). For a discussion of "torts law's economic cues," see infra notes 98-
101 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 5 (1987); GuPDo CALARBS!, THE COST OF ACCIDEN'rS 18-19 (1970).
99. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 98, at 6; CALABRESi, supra note 98, at 18-19.
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imposes damages for engaging in harmful conduct, the costs of engaging in that
conduct increase. " Therefore, harmful activities are deterred by the
imposition of damages to the extent that the costs of engaging in harmful
behavior are increased above the benefits to be gained from those activities. 10 '
However, proponents of the nonprofit and charitable sectors argue that
nonprofit organizations and charities are not utilitarian, self-wealth maximizing
entities, organizations that seek to externalize benefits to society."°r Because
nonprofit and charitable organizations are not self-wealth maximizing entities,
proponents of the nonprofit and charitable sector argue that economic cues, like
a punitive damage award, will be distorted when such an award is imposed on
nonprofit corporations and charities. °" For example, because nonprofit
100. The law and economics analysis of tort law assumes that everyone is economically
rational, and that a person will engage in an activity if the benefit to be gained from the activity
outweighs the costs of the activity. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (3d
ed. 1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv 293,
293 (1992). This is what economists call wealth-maximization. See POSNER, supra, at 3.
With this assumption in mind, consider an example where an economically rational person
wants to engage in an activity because the person will gain financially from that activity or because
the person will gain a certain amount of enjoyment from the activity. This hypothetical will call that
person the tortfeasor. Assume that the amount of gain to be experienced from the activity is worth
ten dollars to the person. However, engaging in some activities will cause someone else to
experience a loss or injury. The person experiencing the loss is the victim. Assume that the loss
will cost five dollars.
Tort law will force the person who gained from the activity to compensate the person who lost.
The tortfeasor will have to pay the victim five dollars. But, in this situation, the tortfeasor will
engage in the activity and pay damages afterwards because the tortfeasor will experience an overall
gain from the activity. In other words, the tortfeasor can compensate the victim and still profit from
the wrongful activity.
Now assume that engaging in the activity will cause eleven dollars of harm to the victim. The
tortfeasor will experience an overall loss in this situation. Assuming that all tortfeasors are
economically rational, the tortfeasor will not engage in this conduct because the tortfeasor will
experience an overall loss. In other words, the activity will not be wealth-maximizing for the
tortfeasor. Economists would say that this is how tort law deters harmful activity. See LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 98, at 5-6. By increasing the costs of an activity, the activity becomes "non-
wealth-maximizing," thereby deterring the rational tortfeasor from engaging in the activity. For
simplicity sake, this note refers to this as the "tort law's economic cues."
101. While the syntax can be confusing, the law and economics model is really nothing more
than Judge Learned Hand's famous formulation of negligence in United States v. Carrol Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). According to Judge Hand, the law of tort should deter
harmful activities only where the cost of the harm, multiplied by its probability, is greater than the
cost of preventing the harm. Id. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-9 (1982).
102. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 426. See also Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 848-
54 (discussing how nonprofit corporations produce public goods); Developments in the Law, supra
note 3, at 1692 (stating that nonprofit corporations externalize the benefit of what they produce
without monetary compensation).
103. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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organizations are not motivated by profit, those who support the nonprofit and
charitable sector argue that in response to the requirement to pay tort judgments,
nonprofit organizations and charities may simply avoid risky activities
altogether, rather than attempt to make the activities less risky and more
profitable.'04  On the other hand, those who support the nonprofit and
charitable sector argue that imposing punitive damages on nonprofit corporations
and charities may not encourage these organizations to avoid risky activities at
all because nonprofit organizations and charities are willing to accept the extra
risk involved in working with dangerous populations and activities."° Finally,
proponents of the nonprofit and charitable sector also argue that excessive
liability could drive nonprofit corporations and charities into bankruptcy because
they do not internalize their profits."
These arguments fail to recognize that charities and nonprofit organizations
are economically rational entities, insofar as they engage in a cost-benefit
analysis when they make program decisions."°7 Charitable organizations and
nonprofit corporations seek to confer the greatest benefit on society that is
possible with limited resources. " In doing so, these organizations will choose
the least costly activities so that they are able to maximize the benefits that they
externalize."°  By imposing punitive damages on nonprofit corporations and
104. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 427. Professor Tremper reasons that because nonprofit
corporations and charities are not motivated by profit, they will avoid risky activities altogether,
rather than jeopardize their charitable missions. Id.
105. Professor Tremper gives the example of an Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome
hospice as an organization that would rather assume the risk of engaging in dangerous activity than
avoid liability. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 429.
106. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 427-28; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1692;
The Qualily of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1388-89.
107. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 427-28. Professor Tremper devotes most of his article to
an analysis of compensatory damages. See id. at 456-66. Professor Tremper also makes it clear
that he is concerned with the effects of liability on charities and not nonprofit corporations generally.
Id. However, Professor Tremper devotes a section of his article to analyzing punitive damages.
Id. at 449. This note addresses Professor Tremper's arguments because Professor Tremper focuses
not only on the nature of compensatory damages, but also suggests that compensatory damages have
a deterrent function. Id. at 426-28. This note extends Professor Tremper's analysis to all nonprofit
corporations, as well as charities, to show that both types of organizations will respond to tort law's
economic cues. See infra text accompanying notes 108-11. Because punitive damages have a
deterrent function, Professor Tremper would argue that charities will not be deterred by an award
of punitive damages. Id. at 449. Because this note argues that charities will be deterred by punitive
damage awards, this note focuses on Professor Tremper's analysis at length. See notes 102-28 and
accompanying text.
108. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1694. C. PETERF. DRUCKER, MANAGING
THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION 107-12 (1990) (arguing that nonprofit corporations should create
market demand for their services).
109. There is some anecdotal evidence that suggests that charities engage in such a cost-benefit
analysis when making program decisions. See supra note 23 and sources cited therein.
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charities that engage in risky activities, the costs of those activities will
increase. 10 Charities will avoid these activities to protect their limited
resources and will engage in other, less risky activities that will maximize the
benefits the organizations confer on society."' Therefore, awarding punitive
damages against charities and nonprofit organizations does have a deterrent
effect.
However, for the sake of argument, even assuming that awarding punitive
damages against charities and nonprofit corporations will not directly affect the
organizations' conduct, an award of punitive damages will have an indirect
effect on the activities of these organizations."' The nonprofit status of
organizations does not magically allow organizations to defy basic principles of
economic survival. " Charities and nonprofit corporations, like other
organizations, must generate enough profit to cover their expenditures." 4 If
nonprofit organizations do not alter their behavior to avoid risky activities, the
organizations will have to turn to their donors for increased contributions to
cover the costs." ' If donors perceive that nonprofit corporations and charities
are using resources inefficiently by engaging in too many risky activities, donors
may withdraw their contributions from the organizations that confer benefits on
society inefficiently, and begin contributing to other organizations that
externalize greater benefits to society at lower costs." 6 If these organizations
engage in too many risky activities, such that the donors are unwilling or unable
to support the liability imposed by excessive awards of punitive damages, the
organizations will be forced into bankruptcy." 7  Therefore, if punitive
110. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text for an economic analysis of the deterrent
function of punitive damages.
111. For some examples of occasions when charities and nonprofit organizations choose to
avoid risky activities, see supra note 23 and sources cited therein.
112. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
113. This results from basic economics: a corporation cannot remain in business for long with
a negative cash flow, even if the corporation is organized as nonprofit. See Nonprofit Enterprise,
supra note 11, at 880. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1582 n.10.
114. See supra note 113 and sources cited therein.
115. See, e.g., Tremper, supra note 9, at 431 (arguing that losses incurred by tort judgments
will be spread among the charities' donors).
116. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 428. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at
1584 n.26. But cf. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 846-47 (arguing that charitable donors
are unable to monitor the efficiency with which charities confer benefits on society because the donor
is not the beneficiary of the services provided by the charity).
117. While nonprofit corporations were once exempt from bankruptcy, see BANKRUPTCY ACT
OF MAR. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, they are now subject to the bankruptcy laws. See
BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1947, ch. 39, 61 Stat. 652, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988). See also
Developments In the Law, supra note 3, at 1678 (discussing the application of bankruptcy law to
charitable organizations). It should also be noted that driving charities and nonprofit corporations
into bankruptcy may be preferable in cases where these organizations are doing more harm than
good. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
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damages are awarded against nonprofit corporations and charities, outside
forces, such as bankruptcy and donors' limited resources, will indirectly deter
charities from engaging in tortious activity.
In addition, whether a nonprofit organization will respond to tort law's
economic cues depends on the nature of the organization in question."'
Private clubs and mutual benefit associations do not externalize benefits to
society but, rather, exist to produce private benefits for their members."1 9
Private clubs and mutual benefit associations are usually run by their
members. " Because the members will gain all the benefit from the
organization and usually control the organization, the members are similar to
stockholders in the for-profit sector. '' The controlling members are likely to
control the corporation in such a way that maximizes internal benefits conferred
to the members at the lowest possible cost."z  If private clubs and mutual
benefit associations engage in risky behavior causing them to be subject to
punitive damage awards, either the benefits conferred on the organizations'
members will decrease or the cost of membership will increase."m To prevent
increases in dues and to prevent the reduction of benefits conferred on members,
the members of these organizations will impose safeguards to avoid these risky
activities." Therefore, private clubs and mutual benefit associations will also
118. See infra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
119. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 892. Professor Hansmann argues that these
organizations produce services for their members, such as food, drink, and recreational facilities,
in return for dues paid by the members.
120. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5056 (West 1981); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 184.5 (West
1987). See also Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 889; Irs Mark Eliman, On Developing a
Law of Nonprofit Corporations, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 153, 154.
121. Cf Bourne v. Williams, 633 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) ("In our modern
society, corporations not for profit are widely used. Many of them.., own, or have access to and
control valuable assets that belong to its [sic] members."). See also Tremper, supra note 9, at 426
(discussing, briefly, the role of shareholders in the for-profit sector). For-profit corporations exist
to maximize the wealth of shareholders who control and own the corporation. See Id. at 426. Like
for-profit corporations, private clubs and mutual benefit associations attempt to maximize the benefits
conferred upon those who control the organization, their members. Cf. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra
note 11, at 892-93.
122. C. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 893 (arguing that members will control private
clubs and mutual benefit associations so as to insure that the organizations do not exploit the
members).
123. This follows from basic accounting principles. Expense cannot exceed revenues or a
corporation will face bankruptcy. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 838; Developments
in the Law, supra note 3, at 1582 n.10. Punitive damage awards increase organizational expenses.
To bring expenses back into equilibrium with revenues, organizations must either increase their
revenue or decrease their expenditures. Private clubs and mutual benefit associations can do this
by either increasing the dues charged to members, thereby increasing revenues to cover the cost of
the tort judgment, or by decreasing the services that they provide, thereby decreasing expenditures.
124. See supra note 122 and source cited therein.
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respond to the economic cues of a punitive damage award."2
With respect to commercial nonprofit organizations that engage in providing
personal services for a price, organizations will have to raise the price of their
services to cover their costs if these organizations suffer punitive damage awards
as a result of engaging in tortious activity." If the costs of services become
too expensive, the patrons of these organizations will seek substitute services,
thereby reducing the revenue of commercial nonprofit corporations."
Therefore, to avoid reduction in their revenues, these organizations are also
likely to respond to the tort system's economic cues.' 2
B. Nonprofit Corporations and Charities Are Unable to Effectively Manage the
Effects of Punitive Damage Awards
Another argument in favor of exempting nonprofit corporations and
charities from punitive damage awards is that the nature of charities and
nonprofit organizations prevents such organizations from implementing
techniques used by the for-profit sector to manage the effects of tort
judgments.'" One such method of loss spreading used by the for-profit sector
is increasing the charge for services or goods rendered.' Another loss
125. For a definition of "tort law's economic cues," see supra notes 98-101 and accompanying
text.
126. Q., Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Mich. 1992) ("Placing
the burden of loas on any particular business will only result in that business raising its prices to pass
these costs along to consumers."). Like any for-profit corporation, commercial nonprofit
corporations can raise the prices of their goods or services in response to liability.
127. Substitute goods and services are goods and services that, although not identical to the
original product or service, satisfy substantially the same needs. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PicE 31-41 (3d ed. 1966). Consumers receive a certain amount of benefit from the
goods and services they purchase. Id. at 1-2. If the cost of a good or service becomes too high
relative to the benefit to be gained from the good or service, the consumer will seek goods and
services that are less expensive but meet substantially the same needs. Id. at 31-33.
128. For a definition and discussion of "tort law's economic cues," see supra notes 98-101 and
accompanying text. Simply put, punitive damages raise operating expenses. In order to meet those
increased operating expenses, corporations will attempt to pass the loss of a punitive damage
judgment on to their consumers. But if corporations attempt to pass too much of their expenses to
consumers through increased prices, consumers will seek substitute goods when the costs outweigh
the benefits of the goods or services. See supra note 127. Therefore, corporations must avoid
incurring too many losses due to tort judgments because they cannot pass all of the costs of tort
judgments to their consumers.
129. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 428-33. Professor Tremper discusses both insurance and
raising prices as loss spreading techniques used by the for-profit sector to spread the loss incurred
by tort judgments. Id.
130. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982)
("[Corporations] can insure against liability and incorporate the cost of the insurance in the price of
the product.").
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spreading technique used by the for-profit sector is insurance. "' The next
section of this Note discusses the viability of these loss spreading techniques in
the nonprofit and charitable sector. 
32
1. Loss Spreading Through Increased Prices
Those who advocate exempting nonprofit organizations and charities from
punitive damage awards argue that nonprofit organizations and charities cannot
spread the loss incurred from an award of punitive damages by increasing the
cost of the services they provide. 33 Proponents of nonprofit organizations and
charities argue that nonprofit organizations and charities are unable to manage
the effect of punitive damage awards because nonprofit organizations and
charities do not charge a price for their services and often serve indigent
populations; therefore, they are unable to pass the cost of the punitive damage
award along to their "consumers."'" This inability to spread the loss through
increasing charges for goods or services may be a justification for exempting
charities and nonprofit organizations from punitive damage awards. 35
However, although charities may not be able to increase the prices of the
services they provide, or may not charge any price at all for their services,
charities can spread the loss incurred by a tort judgment by soliciting increased
donations. "3 In other words, charities may not be able to increase their prices
because they often serve indigent populations, but charities can request increased
donations from their donors. 37 Thus, the real issue is not whether charities
can spread the loss to the customers, but rather whether such a loss spreading
practice would punish innocent donors.'"
In addition, the nature of the nonprofit organization also affects the
organization's ability to pass along the cost of the punitive damage award.'39
131. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 4, at 24-25.
132. See infra notes 133-72 and accompanying text.
133. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 430-31. Professor Tremper argues that while charities
cannot spread the loss incurred by a tort judgment, commercial nonprofit corporations can
adequately spread the loss. Id. However, this note argues that charities can also spread the loss by
asking for increased donations from donors. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
134. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 430-31.
135. Id.
136. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1391. C. Tremper, supra note 9, at 431;
Fagin, supra note 22, at 378 (recognizing that charities can demand increased donations from donors
in response to liability, but arguing that such demands punish donors).
137. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 431; The Qualiry of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1391.
138. For a discussion of whether demands for increased donations have the effect of punishing
innocent donors, see infra notes 173-200 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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Private clubs and mutual benefit associations can pass on the increased costs of
operation resulting from a punitive damage award to the organizations'
members.'" Such organizations usually require dues for membership, and
their members are often relatively affluent. 4 Members will either bear the
increased cost of membership, or find organizations that can provide substitute
services at a lower cost. 42 Thus, because private clubs and mutual benefit
associations can pass along the costs of punitive damage awards to their
members, such organizations should be subject to the same tort damage rules as
for-profit corporations.
Moreover, those organizations that engage in the sale of services or other
commercial activities are able to spread the loss by merely increasing the prices
they charge for the goods or services that they provide. 43 Like any for-profit
corporation, commercial nonprofit corporations may increase the price of their
services in order to spread the loss incurred by a punitive damages award.'"
Thus, nonprofit organizations that engage in commercial activities should be
subject to the same tort damage rules as for-profit corporations because
commercial nonprofit organizations can spread the loss of tortjudgments through
increased prices in the same manner as for-profit organizations."
2. Loss Spreading Through Insurance
Commentators also argue that the nature of the services performed by
nonprofit organizations and charities puts them at a disadvantage in obtaining
insurance.'" Insurers loathe extending insurance coverage to nonprofit
organizations and charities because such organizations are often deemed by
140. Cf. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 892-93 (stating that private clubs and mutual
benefit associations are like for-profit corporations in that they provide services to their members
in return for a price).
141. Id.
142. For a definition of substitute goods and services, see supra note 127.
143. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
144. C., e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business.").
145. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 464 (recognizing that nonprofit corporations that engage
in commercial activities can spread the loss incurred by tort judgments). Even when the doctrine
of complete charitable immunity was in full force, some jurisdictions recognized exceptions to
immunity where charities were engaged in commercial activities, reasoning that they could
adequately spread the loss. See, e.g., Morton v. Savannah Hosp., 96 S.E. 887, 888 (Ga. 1918);
Lincoln Memorial Univ. v. Sutton, 43 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tenn. 1931).
146. Insurers typically complain about the use of volunteers in the nonprofit sector. See
Singsen, supra note 13, at 608-09. Singsen argues that nonprofit organizations often work with
"dangerous" populations, such as children and the disabled. Id. See also Tremper, supra note 9,
at 429-30; Developmens in the Law, supra note 3, at 1690.
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insurance companies to engage in overly risky activities. 47 Moreover, recent
trends in the insurance industry, such as increased premiums"E and reduced
coverage,'O greatly restrict the organizations' ability to obtain insurance that
will completely cover losses incurred by tort judgments.'" This raises the
argument that nonprofit organizations and charities should be exempt from
punitive damage awards because they are unable to spread the loss of a tort
judgment by obtaining insurance.'
However, proponents of this argument again fail to make distinctions
between nonprofit organizations and charities. 2 Non-traditional nonprofit
organizations, such as private clubs, mutual benefit associations, and commercial
organizations that engage in the sale of personal services, do not typically deal
with dangerous populations, nor do they engage in the types of risky activities
that lead insurers to deny coverage. '53 Rather, these organizations engage in
the production of a private benefit for their members and consumers."'5 These
organizations should be able to obtain insurance as easily as any for-profit
corporation. '5
147. See supra note 146 and sources cited therein. Even when insurers will extend coverage
to high risk organizations, the premiums charged for the insurance coverage are usually extremely
high. See Ralph Nader, Loss Prevention and the Insurance Function, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 679,
680-81 (1987).
148. For a definition of premiums, see supra note 13.
149. For a definition of coverage, see supra note 13.
150. For a discussion of recent trends in the insurance market causing increased premiums and
reduced coverage, see supra note 13 and sources cited therein. See also Tremper, supra note 9, at
429-30; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1690; Contra, The Quality of Mercy, supra note
3, at 1395-96 (arguing that favorable insurance regulations will enable charities and nonprofit
corporations to obtain insurance).
151. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 429. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at
1690 (arguing that, although states have passed protective regulations to enable nonprofit
corporations to obtain insurance, because of "gaps" in the laws, nonprofit corporations are still
unable to obtain insurance, and "liability concerns" remain).
152. See infra notes 153-72 and accompanying text.
153. These commercial nonprofit corporations engage in the sale of goods and services to those
who can afford them. See Evolving Law, supra note 11, at 813. The risks involved in selling goods
and services differ significantly from the risks engaged in by charities, such as working with disabled
and indigent populations.
154. For a discussion of how commercial nonprofit corporations, mutual benefit associations,
and private clubs produce private benefits, see supra notes 119 and 153.
155. There is no guarantee that commercial nonprofit organizations will in fact be able to obtain
insurance. Even for-profit corporations have experienced difficulty in obtaining insurance. See
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521-22
(1987) (reporting that insurers have raised premiums on, inter alla, commercial trucking, general
aircraft, and day care activities). But if commercial nonprofit organizations cannot obtain liability
insurance, they can always spread the loss of a tort judgment by raising their prices. See supra
notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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Traditional charities, on the other hand, deal with populations that tend to
lead insurers to deny or restrict coverage. 15 6  Some states, though, have
enacted recent legislation and administrative regulations that will aid charities in
obtaining affordable insurance. 1  Some states have prohibited mid-term
policy cancellationss and premium increases.""5  Other states have
developed Market Assistance Programs 1"° and Joint Underwriting Authorities.
161 While this legislative activity is intended to benefit insurance policy
holders generally, charities should also find it easier to obtain insurance as a
result of this legislation." Therefore, because charities will be able to obtain
affordable, reliable insurance, they will be better able to spread the loss incurred
156. For a discussion of the activities that charities tend to engage in that insurers deem too
risky to insure, see supra note 146.
157. These statutes and administrative regulations are compiled in Brenda Trolin, Controlling
Liability Insurance Costs: State Initiatives in the Area of Insurance Regulation, 11 STATE LEGIs.
REP., May 1986 (Denver, Colorado).
158. Id. at Chart B. Insurance contracts usually specify several grounds for the termination of
coverage. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW, A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 5.11(a), at 601
(1988). A term insurance policy is one that provides coverage for a specified period of time but is
usually renewable at the end of the period. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 806 (6th ed. 1990). A mid-
term policy cancellation, therefore, is the exercise of a contractual right of an insurer to cancel a
policy of insurance before the end of the specified coverage period. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra,
§ 5.11(a), at 601. The statutes and administrative regulations, listed in Trolin, supra note 157, at
Chart B, either prohibit the exercise of this right or prohibit the insertion of such a provision into
an insurance contract.
159. See Trolin, supra note 157, at Chart 2. For a definition of premiums, see supra note 13.
160. By 1986, 33 states had enacted Marketing Assistance Programs [MAPs]. See Singsen,
supra note 13, at 609 n.64. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11890(a) (West 1988). See also The
Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1397.
"MAPs are voluntary pools of insurers that agree to provide insurance for the designated risk
group." Singsen, supra note 13, at 609. See also The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1397.
Under MAPs, the state can also order insurers to reevaluate organizations that have been denied
coverage and to explain why the organizations were denied coverage. See The Quality of Mercy,
supra note 3, at 1397 n.98.
161. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11891(a) (West 1988). Under Joint Underwriting Authorities
[JUAs], state insurers are required to offer policies to certain lines of businesses, including charities.
See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1397 n.98. For a more in depth discussion of JUAs, see
Singsen, supra note 13, at 609-10.
162. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1397. Because of the insurance regulations
discussed at supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text, insurance is presumably made more
reliable, more available, and less expensive. Charities, even though they present higher than average
risks, should be better able to obtain insurance in the favorable market created by this legislation.
See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1397. But even if this assumption is false, charities can
self-insure by employing the methods, such as risk pooling and group purchasing, discussed at infra
notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
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by a tort judgment. 1
In addition, other methods of risk management, such as risk pooling, would
allow charities to protect themselves against punitive damage awards." 4  By
forming their own insurance pool, charities will not have to rely on the
commercial market for insurance."~ Similarly, charities could increase their
ability to obtain insurance through group purchasing. " Through group
purchasing, charities could obtain more favorable rates and better coverage. 167
In addition, charities could implement better risk management, which
should increase their ability to obtain insurance." Risk management, which
decreases the likelihood of a loss, makes an organization more attractive to
insurers."S Some examples of risk management techniques that charities could
employ are: improved employee and volunteer selection criteria, better
employee and volunteer training programs, and improved employee and
volunteer supervision programs.'
Because various techniques are available to allow charities to obtain
insurance and because there are insurance "substitutes" available to charities, the
lack of available insurance for charities is exaggerated.'7 ' Charities can spread
the loss of a punitive damage award by obtaining insurance through group
163. There is no guarantee that charities will in fact be able to obtain insurance. But again,
charities can use the other methods to spread the loss of a tort judgment if the commercial insurance
market fails to provide adequate insurance options. See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
164. Although the technical aspects of risk pooling are beyond the scope of this note, the
general idea is that a group of charities agree to put some of their assets into a fund that is used to
pay for losses incurred by all the charities in the fund. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at
1396. For a more in depth discussion of risk pooling, see Singsen, supra note 13, at 612-14.
165. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1396.
166. By negetiating as a group with an insurance company, the group can use its numbers and
assets as leverage in obtaining more favorable policy terms. See Singsen, supra note 13, at 611-12;
The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1397. Although such group purchasing has traditionally been
limited to life and health insurance, Congress has enacted legislation designed to encourage broader
group purchasing practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 3901-3906 (1988). See also Singsen, supra note 13,
at 611-12.
167. Group purchasing occurs when a group of organizations negotiates with a single insurer
under a 'master agreement" of insurance covering all of the organizations in the group. See
Singsen, supra note 13, at 611; The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1396.
168. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1397.
169. See C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 200 (6th ed. 1989); Singsen, supra note 13, at 610-11.
170. See Jefferey D. Kahn, Organization's Liability for Torts of Volunteers, 133 U. PA. L.
REv. 1433, 1449-50 (1985).
171. See supra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
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purchasing, risk pooling or risk management. " Therefore, concerns about
the ability of charities to spread the loss of punitive damage awards are
overstated.
C. An Award of Punitive Damages Punishes Innocent Charitable Donors,
Thereby Deterring Charitable Donations
Those who advocate exempting charities and nonprofit organizations from
punitive damage awards also argue that awarding punitive damages against
nonprofit organizations and charities may not deter tortious conduct by these
organizations if the punitive damage awards punish the innocent donors rather
than the organizations.'" Those who support this argument further assert that
donors may cease to make contributions to charities if the punitive damage
award punishes the innocent donors rather than the charities and nonprofit
corporations. 7' Although there is no empirical data to support the contention
that awarding punitive damages against a charity deters charitable donations,
proponents of this argument further assert that any reduction in charitable
donations will directly result in a reduction in the amount of public benefits that
charities and nonprofit corporations will be able to produce. 73 Proponents of
the argument that awarding punitive damages against charities and nonprofit
organizations punishes innocent donors have made an analogy to municipal
immunity and have argued that such an award also frustrates the intent of'
charitable donors. 76 The following sections will address each of these
arguments separately. 177
172. Although there is some disagreement among the states as to whether liability insurance
covers punitive damage claims, the issue is usually determined as a matter of contract between the
insurer and the insured. See JOHN W. MORMISON, THE INSURABILrrY OF PUNmVE DAMAOES 3-4
(1985). Charities can insure against punitive damages by bargaining for coverage. Although such
coverage is likely to be expensive, charities could use measures such as group purchasing to reduce
the costs of insuring against such losses. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
173. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 431; Fagin, supra note 22, at 387-88; Developments in the
Law, supra note 3, at 1692; McMenamin, supra note 65, at 17. The general idea presented by
these authors is that punishing the donors is not justified if they are not responsible for the tortious
conduct of the charities or nonprofit corporations. See, e.g., Tremper, supra note 9, at 431. If the
donors are not responsible for the tortious conduct, punishing the donors will have no deterrent
effect. See, e.g., Fagin, supra note 22, at 378 n.9.
174. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 431; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1692;
McMenamin, supra note 65, at 17.
175. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 431. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at
1692 (arguing that the threat of liability has, in the past, caused donors and volunteers to stop
donating their time and money).
176. See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 178-200 and accompanying text.
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1. Immunity of Municipal Governments
Arguing that punitive damage awards against nonprofit organizations and
charities punish innocent donors, commentators have analogized charities and
nonprofit organizations to municipal governments. " Various cases and
statutes reason that municipal governments should be exempt from punitive
damage awards. 1" Courts and legislatures have argued that the goals of
punitive damages are not advanced when innocent taxpayers are made to pay the
costs of such an award. " In other words, courts and legislatures have
recognized that the municipality is likely to pass the cost of the punitive damage
award to the taxpayers in the form of increased taxes, thereby punishing the
innocent taxpayer rather than the municipality."" By analogy, proponents of
nonprofit organizations and charities argue that nonprofit organizations and
charities may attempt to pass the cost of a punitive damage award to innocent
donors in the same way that a municipality would pass the cost of a punitive
damage award to its innocent taxpayers."s
However, the analogy between the unfairness of punishing innocent
taxpayers and the unfairness of punishing innocent donors fails to consider the
differences between various types of nonprofit organizations.'" For example,
in cases involving private clubs and mutual benefit associations, those who make
donations to the clubs and associations are also members of the clubs and
associations.'" Because the "donors" are also members, the donors are able
to control the clubs and associations through participation in the organization's
decisionmaking bodies.I" Although imposing punitive damages on these
178. See, e.g., Fagin, supra note 22, at 380-83 (analogizing nonprofit corporations to municipal
governments).
179. See infra note 180 and sources cited therein.
180. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 818 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.04 (West
1994); Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988)).
181. Facts Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267. In Facts Concerts, the Court held that Congress did not
intend for plaintiffs to be able to obtain punitive damages against municipalities in actions brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 271. Although the Court recognized that municipalities were
generally treated like corporations, the Court stated that awarding punitive damages against
municipalities would be contrary to public policy "because such awards would burden the very
taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised." Id. at 263.
182. See, e.g
, 
Fagin, supra note 22, at 380-83 (analogizing nonprofit corporations to
municipalities).
183. See infra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
184. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 892.
185. Professor Hansmann, in Evolving Law, supra note 11, at 892, explains that these
organizations provide services to their patrons, such as food, drink, and recreational facilities. Id.
Because the patrons are also members of the organization and exercise control over the
organization's affairs, they can make sure that they are never exploited by the organizations. Id.
at 893.
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organizations might be said to have a punishing effect on these organizations'
"donors" in the form of either decreased services or increased dues," 6
punishing "donors" in the case of clubs and associations would be preferable
because donors would be motivated and able to control the organization in such
a way that avoids increases in dues and decreases in services. i' In other
words, even if awarding punitive damages against mutual benefit associations
and private clubs actually punishes these organizations' "donors," it is not
unfair to punish these donors because they will be able to prevent the respective
organization from committing future torts.
In addition, with respect to commercial nonprofit organizations, the analogy
between punishing innocent taxpayers and punishing innocent "donors" becomes
even weaker.ss If commercial nonprofit organizations are to pass the costs
of punitive damages to their "donors," they will have to do so in the form of
increased prices.'" As in private markets, if the products marketed by
commercial nonprofit corporations become so expensive that they are not wealth-
maximizing, consumers will look elsewhere for substitute goods to satisfy their
needs."g  Therefore, the punitive damage award will not have any punitive
effect on the donors because the donors will merely seek replacement goods and
services elsewhere if the cost of the goods and services provided by the
commercial nonprofit organization becomes exorbitant or economically
inefficient.19 '
Finally, with respect to traditional charities, it should first be noted that
awarding punitive damage awards against traditional charities may not deter
186. Again, expenses cannot exceed revenues or a corporation will face bankruptcy. See
Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1582 n.10; Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 880.
To bring expenses back into equilibrium with revenues after a punitive damage award, private clubs
and mutual benefit associations can either increase the dues charged to members, or decrease the
services that they provide, thereby decreasing expenditures.
187. Cf. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 893 (arguing that members of private clubs and
mutual benefit associations will control these organizations in such a way as to prevent exploitation
of the members).
188. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, 486 N.W.2d 612, 626 (Mich. 1992)
(reasoning that commercial organizations pass the cost of tort judgments to consumers by increasing
the prices of the goods and services that they produce).
190. For a definition of substitute goods and a discussion of how substitute goods operate as
a constraint on the marketing behavior of nonprofit corporations, see supra note 127.
191. If commercial nonprofit corporations attempt to pass the costs of successive tort judgments
to consumers, the prices of their goods and services will, at some point, become prohibitively
expensive for consumers. Consumers will then turn to other producers, whether they be nonprofit
or for-profit, for substitute goods and services. See generally STIGLER, supra note 127. This will
result in a reduction of the tortfeasor-nonprofit corporation's revenue. Therefore, commercial
nonprofit corporations will be motivated to avoid harmful conduct in order to maintain the prices
of their goods at an affordable level.
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donors from making charitable contributions at all. " While traditional
charities, like municipalities, will no doubt attempt to pass along the cost of a'
punitive damage award to donors in the form of requests for increased
donations, 19 it is difficult to see how the charitable donor would feel punished
by such action. The charitable donor, unlike the taxpayer, is free to make
increased contributions and may refuse to meet the charity's demands for
increased contributions.'9 Because donors are free to refuse to meet the
demands for increased donations, an attempt by charities to pass the costs of a
tort judgment to donors will not have a punitive effect on the donors.
However, in the case of traditional charities, assuming that an award of
punitive damages against charities punishes the charitable donors, donors may
be deterred from making future charitable contributions. 95 If charitable
contributions are reduced, the ability of charities to produce social benefits will
similarly be reduced since charities will simply lack sufficient funding to
continue operations." Yet in some situations, it may be preferable to deter
charitable donations." Some charities may produce more social harm than
social benefit, and in such cases, there is no reason why these charities should
not be deprived of their ability to operate by punishing donors, thereby striking
at their assets and revenue generating ability.' If punitive damages in fact
192. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
194. A taxpayer is required, under threat of fine and imprisonment, to pay personal income
taxes. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (1988) (providing for criminal sanctions for federal tax evasion).
While charitable donors may feel morally obligated to make contributions to charity, donors are not
threatened with dire consequences if they refuse to give to charity.
195. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 431. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at
1692 (stating that the threat of liability has, in the past, dissuaded donors from giving their resources
to charities and nonprofit corporations).
196. See, e.g, Cook v. John N. Morton Memorial Infirmary, 202 S.W. 874, 876 (Ky. 1918)
(opining that if charities were liable in tort, donors would withhold donations, resulting in the
destruction of the charitable sector). See also Tremper, supra note 9, at 431; Developments in the
Law, supra note 3, at 1690.
197. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
198. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1693; The Quality of Mercy, supra note
3, at 1388-91. While it is difficult to define social benefits absent political and socio-economic valuie
laden judgment, see infra notes 292-94, an overly simplified example may illustrate this point.
Assume, for example, that a charity provides a service worth 10 dollars, including the reduction in
transaction costs that results from the charitable sector, rather than the government, producing the
service. Also assume that the charity is very accident prone and causes 11 dollars worth of injury
for each 10 dollars worth of services it produces. Thus, while the charity has produced social
benefits, however one chooses to define that term, the charity has produced that service at a net loss
to society.
Yet, while the charity is producing a net loss, the charity may be able to remain in business
because donors are either unable or unwilling to monitor the efficiency of the charity. Therefore,
assuming that awarding punitive damages against charities does deter charitable donations, a point
which this note does not concede lightly, this result may be preferable when a charity is
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deter donors from making charitable donations, then such an award against
charities would be an effective way to prevent socially harmful charities from
generating operating revenue.'" Charities that do more harm than good would
be unable to obtain funding for their activities and would be driven out of
business.'
2. Awarding Punitive Damages Against Charities and Nonprofits Frustrates the
Intent of Donors
Assuming that charitable donations are made with the expectation that the
donation will be used to produce some social benefit, commentators have argued
that, if charitable donations are diverted from producing public benefit and used
instead to satisfy tort judgments, the intent of the donors will be frustrated."'
Based on this reasoning, commentators conclude that punitive damages should
not be awarded against nonprofit corporations and charities because doing so
will frustrate the intent of the donors.' Therefore, commentators argue, if
the intent of charitable donors is frustrated, donors will discontinue charitable
donations. 3
Again, however, this argument ignores the distinctions between traditional
charities and modem-day nonprofit corporations.' For example, with respect
to commercial nonprofit organizations that engage in the sale of goods and
personal services, "donors" do not intend that their donations be used to produce
public benefits.' Rather, "donors" intend to receive personal benefits from
economically inefficient or when a charity produces more harm than good. However, deterring only
those charities that produce more harm than good presents significant difficulties because there is
no accurate measure to determine how much "public good" charities are producing. See infra notes
224-26 and accompanying text.
199. Charities are usually supported by donations. See supra note 11 and sources cited therein.
Because donations are usually a charity's only source of revenue, deterring donations would halt the
charitable sector's flow of income.
200. Cf supra note 63 and sources cited therein.
201. See, e.g., Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 75 N.E. 991, 993 (Ill. 1905):
An institution ... doing charitable work of great benefit to the public without profit.
. .is not to be hampered in the acquisition of property and funds from [donors] by any
doubt that might arise in the minds of such intending donors as to whether the funds
supplied by them will be applied to the purposes for which they intended to devote
them, or diverted to the entirely different purpose of satisfying [tort] judgments ....
Id. at 993. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1692.
202. Cf. Tremper, supra note 9, at 431 (arguing that holding charities fully liable in tort will
burden donors with requests for increased donations).
203. Id.
204. See infra notes 205-26 and accompanying text.
205. See infra note 206 and sources cited therein.
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the goods and services that they purchase." Although imposing punitive
damages against these commercial nonprofit organizations may increase the price
of the services provided by these organizations, the increase in price will not
affect the benefit that the "donors" receive from the goods or services
purchased.' In other words, those who make "donations" to commercial
nonprofit corporations are simply ambivalent as to whether the price they pay
for goods and services is used to pay a punitive damage judgment.
On the other hand, with respect to private clubs and mutual benefit
associations, awarding punitive damages against these organizations would
probably frustrate the intent of the "donors" of such clubs and associations.'
Again, noting that members and "donors" of such clubs are usually one in the
same,' typical club members rarely intend their dues to be expended to pay
tort judgments.210 However, even if the "donors'" intent is frustrated by a
punitive damage award against such clubs and associations, frustrating the intent
of "donors" may be preferable to immunity with respect to organizations that
produce only private benefits.2"' In these organizations, "donors" are usually
in a position to both control the organization's activities and prevent future harm
from occurring."' If awarding punitive damages against these organizations
punishes "donors" by causing their dues or fees to be diverted to pay tort
judgments, rather than being applied to produce better goods and services for
members of the clubs and associations, the "donors" will be both motivated and
willing to alter the conduct of these organizations so as to prevent the
organization from engaging in tortious conduct in the future.2"3
206. Some examples of commercial nonprofit corporations that provide services at a cost are
daycare centers, residential nursing care institutions, and hospitals. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra
note 11, at 863-66. A patient at a nonprofit hospital is, in a way, a donor to a nonprofit
organization. The patient will make a monetary "contribution" to the hospital, but the patient
expects a benefit (i.e. medical treatment) in return for the "contribution." By contrast, when a
donor makes a contribution to a traditional charity, such as the American Red Cross, the donor
expects no benefit in return except that the Red Cross use the contribution for the benefit of others.
See generally Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11.
207. Again using Professor Hansmann's example in Evolving Law, supra note 11, at 813, a
patient at a nonprofit hospital receives medical services for a price. Id. Awarding punitive damages
against the hospital will arguably affect the cost of the medical services, but the patient will receive
the same benefit from a "contribution."
208. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
210. Rather, members intend to receive services in return for their dues. See Nonprofit
Enterprise, supra note 11, at 892.
211. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanyingtext for a discussion of why it may be preferable
to punish members of private clubs and mutual benefit associations by imposing punitive damages
on the organizations to which they belong.
212. See supra note 185 and sources cited therein.
213. See, e.g., Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 893 (arguing that members will control
the organization in such a way as to prevent exploitation of the members).
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However, in the case of traditional charities, whether imposing punitive
damage awards on traditional charities would frustrate the donors' intent by
diverting donations from producing public good to paying tort judgments
depends on whether the donors ever intended the charity to use the donation for
the public benefit." 4 On one hand, charitable donors may give resources to
charities intending that the resources be used for the benefit of others in
society.215 If donors perceive that the resources are used to pay tort judgments
and are not used for the public benefit, donors arguably will discontinue
contributions." 6 In that case, the charitable sector's ability to produce social
benefits would be reduced or destroyed.
On the other hand, it is unclear what motivates charitable donors, and the
donor's motivation in giving is central to a determination of whether awarding
punitive damages against charities will deter future charitable donations to
traditional charities. 2 7 For example, instead of a desire to produce public
benefits, donors may be motivated by the tax incentives given to charitable
donors.2 3 If donors contribute to charitable organizations because of tax
incentives, it is unlikely that donors will be deterred by an award of punitive
damages against charities, because the donor will receive a "tax break"
regardless of whether charities use the donations for the public good or to pay
punitive damage judgments.219 In addition, there are many other self-centered
interests that may cause one to give to charities, including social climbing, guilt,
or self-aggrandizement.' Similar to donating for purposes of receiving a
"tax break," if donors contribute for some self-centered purpose, it is unlikely
that donors will be deterred by an award of punitive damages against charities,
because donors will receive the expected benefit from their donations regardless
of whether charities use the donations for the public good or to pay punitive
damages judgments.
Moreover, deterring donations to charities may be preferable in some
214. See infra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
215. See I.R.C. § 170 (1988) (providing that contributions to charitable organizations are
exempt from personal income taxation). See also Joseph V. Sliskovich, Chartable Contributions
or Gifts: A Contemporaneous Look Back to the Future, 57 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 437, 437 (1989);
Edward M. Fjordbak, Philanthropy at the Crossroads, 125 TR. AND EST., Aug. 1986, at 25, 27.
216. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1692.
217. For some conjecture as to the motivation behind charitable donations, see infra notes 218-
20 and accompanying text.
218. See I.R.C. § 170 (1988). See also KLIEN & BANKMAN, supra note 45, at 490-92, 498
n.2.
219. Contributions to charities, as defined in the Internal Revenue Code, are deductible from
personal income taxation regardless of how the charity spends the contribution. See I.R.C. § 170
(1988).
220. See Fjordbak, supra note 215, at 27.
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circumstances. " If charities are producing more harm than good, it would
be preferable to award punitive damages against those charities, while exempting
other charities that produce more social good than harm.' Such a rule would
deter donations to only "harmful" charities."2 3 However, the difficulty with
such a rule is that it is unworkable in practice.'2 How to measure "public
good" and how to determine what constitutes public good involve value laden
judgments that may allow for discrimination against less popular and less
politically powerful charities.2' Therefore, a rule that treats all charities
equally, regardless of the amount of "public good" they produce, is preferable
to avoid the practical problems of administering a rule that requires a
determination of what constitutes a public good.'
D. An Award of Punitive Damages Against Nonprofits and Charities Punishes
Innocent Beneficiaries
Those who support charities and nonprofit organizations also argue that
awarding punitive damages against nonprofit organizations and charities may
punish innocent beneficiaries.'n The argument is that such an award prevents
nonprofit corporations and charities from producing benefits for their intended
beneficiaries, thereby depriving the beneficiaries of the benefit they would have
received had the nonprofit organizations and charities not been liable.'
Further, these advocates argue that punishing the beneficiaries is not justifiable
because the beneficiaries are not responsible for harm caused by the charities,
and, therefore, they are not culpable.
221. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
222. See Development in the Law, supra note 3, at 1693.
223. Id. The author of Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1693, proposes a plan of
government subsidization for charities that produce more public good than harm. Id. at 1693-96.
This proposal will be discussed in more detail at infra notes 313-43 and accompanying text.
224. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties inherent
in determining which charities produce more harm than good.
225. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1694-96.
226. This note proposes a plan that would treat charities equally with respect to liability for
punitive damages. See infra notes 319-43 and accompanying text. This note recognizes that
awarding punitive damages may have negative effects on the charitable sector, such as deterring
charitable work and punishing innocent beneficiaries. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying
text. However, these negative effects must be balanced against the law's desire to prevent future
harms by imposing punitive damages on tortfeasors. See infra notes 318-19 and accompanyingtext.
227. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 431-32; see also Fagin, supra note 22, at 389-90 (arguing
that imposing punitive damages on nonprofit corporations punishes innocent beneficiaries and
members of these organizations).
228. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 431 ("'rMhe impact of tort liability falls most directly upon
beneficiaries who would have received services but for the liability-related expenses of a charitable
organization.").
229. See Fagin, supra note 22, at 378. But see The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1391
(arguing that society should shift the cost of harm to the beneficiaries of charities).
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Again, it should be noted that this argument is directed at traditional
charities, rather than modem day nonprofit corporations.' Commercial
nonprofit corporations will attempt to pass the costs of a punitive damage award
to their consumers by raising their prices in response to liability.' However,
consumers do not have to pay these increased prices and can seek substitute
services to'satisfy their needs. 2 Because consumers possess this freedom, the
increased prices really have no punitive effect on the "beneficiaries" of these
commercial nonprofit corporations.233
With respect to mutual benefit organizations or private clubs, awarding
punitive damages against such organizations may in fact have a punitive effect
on the beneficiaries of these organizations. 2' Again, in the case of private
clubs and mutual benefit organizations, the members are usually both "donors"
and "beneficiaries" of the organization.' Because the members will have
made donations to the organization, they will be deprived of the benefit they
would have received from that donation had the organization not been subjected
to a punitive damage award.23
However, such a punishing effect on the beneficiaries may be preferable in
the case of private clubs and mutual benefit associations. 7  If private clubs
and mutual benefit associations are liable for punitive damage awards, the
beneficiaries, who are also members, will be punished through increased dues
or decreased services.' In order to avoid increased dues and decreased
services, the members will be motivated to control these organizations to avoid
230. See infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
231. Again, nonprofit corporations, like for-profit corporations, cannot defy the laws of
economics: corporate expenses cannot exceed revenues. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11,
at 880; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1582 n. 10. Punitive damage awards against a
corporation increase operating expenses. To meet those increased expenses, corporations will
increase the price of the goods or services they produce.
232. For a definition of substitute goods and services, see supra note 127. For an explanation
of how substitute goods operate as a constraint on marketing behavior in the nonprofit sector, see
supra note 128.
233. See supra note 127 for a discussion of how consumers will seek substitute goods and
services to satisfy their needs.
234. See Fagin, supra note 22, at 378.
235. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 892-93.
236. See Fagin, supra note 22, at 378 n.9, 389-90.
237. For a discussion of why it may be preferable to punish and deter members of private clubs
and mutual benefit associations by imposing punitive damages on the organizations, see supra notes
212-13 and accompanying text.
238. Again, this is a result of basic economics: revenues must be greater than expenses. See
Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 880. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at
1582 n.10. Because a punitive damage award increases operating expenses, private clubs and mutual
benefit associations will have to either increase revenues through increased dues, or decrease
expenses by decreasing the amount of services they produce for their members.
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tortious conduct in the future.' Therefore, a punitive damage award against
these types of organizations will have the preferred effect of deterring future
harmful activities, because the members of the organization will control the
organization in' the future in such a way that will avoid organizationalliability~u °
On the other hand, imposing punitive damages against traditional charities
is likely to deprive their beneficiaries of benefits."' Traditional charities
usually provide services at little or no cost to indigent populations. t 2 These
beneficiaries are usually unable to purchase substitute services and often rely on
charities for goods and services necessary for survival.4 3 Depleting the
resources of charities by imposing punitive damages would result in a reduction
of the services provided to less fortunate populations and would work as a
punishment on innocent beneficiaries.Y' Therefore, the punishing effect of a
punitive damage award on beneficiaries is a valid reason for reforming the law
of punitive damages as applied to traditional charities.
E. Imposing Punitive Damages on Nonprofits and Charities Deprives Society
of Social Benefits
Those who favor exempting nonprofit organizations and charities from
punitive damage awards also argue that charities and nonprofit organizations
provide redress for social problems, thereby reducing the burden on the
government and the private sector.' The concern is that imposing punitive
239. C. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 11, at 892-93 (stating that members of private clubs
and mutual benefit associations will control these organizations in such a way as to prevent them
from exploiting the members).
240. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
242. Cf. Tremper, supra note 9, at 432.
243. See id.:
[In consumer marketaJ consumers are free (within their economic means) to pay a
higher price that includes a pro rata [sic] share of loss costs. This option is not
available to [beneficiaries] of free charitable services. The dynamics of the free service
delivery system produce a dichotomy in the availability arrangement:... beneficiaries
either receive a service without charge or they do not receive it at all.
Id.
244. See id. at 431-32; Fagin, supra note 22, at 378. But see The Quality of Mercy, supra
note 3, at 1391 (arguing that charities should bear part of the costs associated with charitable
activities).
245. See, e.g., Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 107 S.E. 785 (Va. 1921):
The states and the municipalities maintain hospitals for the insane, for the deaf, dumb,
and blind ... for the treatment of the sick, and for surgical operations on those in need
of it .... Now public charities, privately conducted from mere benevolence, are great
adjuncts to such charities conducted by the state or municipality .... ; and, while it
may not be safe or desirable to place them above the law, it is manifestly desirable that
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damages against nonprofits and charities will deprive society of these social
benefits.' In turn, the burden of producing these benefits would fall on state
governments if the nonprofit and charitable sector did not produce these benefits
for society. 7
One answer to this argument is that many nonprofits do not provide social
benefits but rather provide private benefits.' Commercial nonprofit
organizations, private clubs, and mutual benefit associations provide services at
a cost to those who can afford the services. 9 Therefore, these organizations
produce no more benefit to society than for-profit corporations.'
However, as applied to traditional charities, the concern that imposing
punitive damages will deprive society of these social benefits is valid."
Traditional charities provide remedies for social problems, reduce burdens on
government and the private sector, and reduce the transaction costs of providing
services to indigent populations. 2  Imposing punitive damages on traditional
charities arguably will have the effect of reducing the ability of traditional
charities to provide these social benefits, and may deter socially beneficial
activities. 3
F. A Charitable Purpose Should Exempt Tortfeasors From Liability
A strong argument can be made in favor of imposing punitive damages on
both traditional charities and modem nonprofit corporations.' The law of
tort is based, at least in part, on the social judgment that individuals should not
they should be encouraged in their good work ....
1d. at 790. See also H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong, 3d Sess. 17 (1938), quoted in infra note 252.
246. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 435; Development in the Law, supra note 3, at 1692; 7he
Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1388.
247. See supra note 245 and infra note 252 and sources cited therein (discussing how charities
alleviate burdens on government by supplying public welfare services).
248. See supra notes 45, 53 for a discussion of how commercial nonprofit corporations, private
clubs, and mutual benefit associations produce private, rather than public benefits.
249. See Nonprofit Enterprse, supra note 11, at 892-93; Evolving Law, supra note 11, at 813.
250. It is arguable that even for-profit corporations produce social benefits by generating
products and services to satisfy the needs and demands of consumers.
251. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong. 3d, Sess. 19 (1938):
The exemption from taxation on money or property devoted to charitable... purposes
is based on the theory that Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its
relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by the appropriation
of public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.
Id.
253. C)r Tremper, supra note 9, at 425-28, 430-32 (arguing that full liability will over-deter
charitable activity and deplete the assets of the charitable sector).
254. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
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harm others.2 A punitive damage award signals to tortfeasors that society
disapproves of the conduct in which the tortfeasors engaged, and that such
conduct will not be tolerated in American society.'
Yet, some commentators argue that the lack of malice, presumed to be
present in charitable activity, should exonerate charities from punishment."
But despite good intentions, if charities recklessly injure others in accomplishing
their charitable works, punitive damages should be imposed on charities to
encourage them to make their future activities safer in the future.' Imposing
punitive damages on charities in appropriate cases may endanger the ability of
charities to produce public benefits. However, punitive awards will also insure
that charities produce benefits for society safely and efficiently, rather than in
a way that injures others.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
There are persuasive arguments on both sides of the issue of whether
255. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 2, § 4, at 20-23. See also George Fletcher, Fairness and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
256. See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard [1964] App. Cas. 1129, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367, cited in
Kotler, supra note 72, at 89:
Where a defendant with a cynical disregard for a plaintiff's rights has calculated that the
money to be made out of his wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages at risk, it
is necessary for the law to show that it cannot be broken with impunity. This category
is not confined to moneymaking in the strict sense. It extends to cases in which the
defendant Is seeking to gain at the expense of the plaintiff some object .... Exemplary
damages can properly be awarded whenever it is necessary to teach a wrongdoer that
tort does not pay.
Id. (emphasis added).
This is arguably a modern conception of the function of punitive damages. See Kotler, supra
note 72, at 89-90. But this view of punitive damages has gained recent acceptance in the United
States. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388 (1981); Gryc v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Minn. 1980), cited in Koer, supra note 72, at 91, 103
(awarding punitive damages because the defendant callously weighed costs and benefits of dangerous
conduct).
257. See, e.g., Development in the Law, supra note 3, at 1694. "Because society benefits from
the activities of ... nonprofits, society should ... help pay for their accident costs." Id.
258. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957) ('It is not alone good morals but
sound law that individuals and organizations should be just before they are generous.. . ."). See
also 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 190, at 232 (1976) ("Carelessness is not kindness; it is actionable
wrongdoing, albeit by a charity."). See also The Quality of Mercy, supra note 2, at 1387
('[Immunity is forgiveness for wrongdoing-for willful [wrongdoing] or for failure to take due
care-and the overall goodness of a wrongdoer does not, in law, excuse the wrong."). See also
McMenamin, supra note 65, at 19 ("[Slociety demands additional punishment for a callous disregard
or indifference to the rights of others . . . . Non-profits must not be exempt from rules of
reasonable societal behavior.").
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traditional charities should pay punitive damages. 9 First, a punitive damage
award will have a deterrent effect on charities because charities must prosper or
perish under economic constraints.' To save their limited resources from
being depleted by punitive damage awards, charities will avoid overly risky
activity or will implement risk management techniques to avoid liability."
Moreover, imposing punitive damages on charities is necessary to achieve the
social function of tort law.' A punitive damage award signals to both the
tortfeasor and society that tortious conduct is not acceptable and a mere
charitable purpose will not excuse a wrongdoer from liability if the actor is
aware that the contemplated conduct will probably result in harm to others.'
Yet there is a possibility that imposing punitive damages on charities will
reduce the amount of charitable activity in society.' A punitive damage
award may over-deter charities, thereby reducing the benefits gained by society
from charitable activity.' In addition, there is little justification for charities
taking money that will be used for the public good and placing it in the hands
of a private plaintiff, where it will be used for a private benefit.?
These conflicting policy considerations have led to at least three suggestions
for reform in the law of punitive damages with respect to traditional
charities. 7 First, Professor Tremper outlined a detailed "charitable redress
system" and suggested that charities should only pay punitive damages where the
tortious conduct of charity employees or volunteers is sanctioned by a charity
259. For a general discussion of the arguments on both sides of the issue of whether nonprofit
corporations and charities should pay punitive damages, see supra notes 77-258 and accompanying
text.
260. See supra notes 97-128 and accompanying text for a discussion of how tort law's
economic cues apply to nonprofit corporations and charities.
261. See supra notes 95-172 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 195-200, 214-16 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 26 and sources cited therein.
267. One suggestion is to allow punitive damages against charities only when the charities have
sanctioned the tortious conduct of their volunteers or employees. See Tremper, supra note 9, at
449. Another suggestion is to subsidize only those nonprofit corporations that produce more public
benefits than harm. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1693-95. A proposal adopted
by some states is to place a cap on the amount of damages that can be levied against charities. See
supra note 19 and sources cited therein.
Ms. Fagin has also suggested a proposal for reform. See Fagin, supra note 22, at 391. Like
Professor Tremper's "charitable redress system," Ms. Fagin's proposal would allow punitive
damages against a nonprofit corporation only where the nonprofit corporation ratified the tortious
conduct of its employees and volunteers, or where the nonprofit corporation is a sham. However,
because this proposal is so similar to Professor Tremper's proposal, it will not be treated separately
in the text of this note.
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with the knowledge that the contemplated conduct would cause unjustifiable
harm.' In addition, under this "charitable redress system," only the state
attorney general would be empowered to bring punitive damage claims against
charities.m
This suggested reform presents significant problems." First, Professor
Tremper argues that imposing punitive damages is justified only where the
award will have its expected deterrent effect."' This leads Professor Tremper
to conclude that a punitive damage award will have a deterrent effect only where
the tortious conduct is sanctioned by charities.' Under Professor Tremper's
system, punitive damages should be awarded against traditional charities only
where the organization itself knew of and approved of the tortious conduct."
However, if punitive damages were awarded only where charities sanction
tortious conduct, charities would have no motivation to implement risk
management techniques to avoid injurious conduct. 4 Professor Tremper's
arguments ignore the punitive damage award's effect of encouraging
implementation of risk management techniques to avoid injury caused by the
tortious acts of employees and volunteers.' 5
In addition, Professor Tremper's "charitable redress system" 6 also
presents significant constitutional problems.' Because this system provides
that only the state attorney general may sue for punitive damages against a
charity," the system implicates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment."' The Supreme Court of the United States, in Browning-Ferris
Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ,' held that the Excessive Fines Clause is
268. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 445-49. Even though Professor Tremper proposes that
punitive damages should be imposed on charities only when they have sanctioned tortious conduct,
he does not define what degree of culpability is necessary for charities to attain the level of
"sanctioning" tortious conduct. Id. at 449.
269. Id.
270. See infra notes 271-87 and accompanying text.
271. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 449.
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
275. Id. Again, awarding punitive damages against charities would provide an incentive for
those organizations to exercise greater control over their employees and volunteers.
276. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 445, 449.
277. See infra notes 278-87 and accompanyingtext (discussing the constitutionality of Professor
Tremper's "charitable redress system").
278. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 449.
279. U.S. CONST. amend. V1I. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
280. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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generally not applicable to an award of punitive damages to private
plaintiffs."8  However, the Court implied that the rights protected by the
Excessive Fines Clause can be infringed where the government either has
prosecuted the action for punitive damages or has a right to receive a share of
the damages awarded.
2 2
Under the eighth amendment standard established in Browning-Ferris,
Professor Tremper's "charitable redress system"' is likely to be held
unconstitutional. By empowering the state attorney general to bring an action
for punitive damages, the "charitable redress system" would run afoul of the
Eighth Amendment's implicit limitation on "penalties" if a large punitive
damage award was levied against a charity.2 Therefore, this "charitable
redress system" is not only difficult to justify in policy,2' but is also limited
by constitutional concerns.W
Another reform suggested by one commentator is that charities should be
fully liable in tort, but the government should provide direct accident cost
subsidies to charities to help them bear the financial burden of tort
judgments.' The legislature would determine the amount of subsidy that
should be allocated to each charity through a legislative determination of the
amount of public benefit produced by the charity.' The author of this
proposal reasons that the accident cost subsidies and public benefits should be
"linked" to insure that those organizations producing more harm than good are
driven out of business, while those charities producing more good than harm
will be able to continue their good works.211
The initial problem with this proposal is that it would be unworkable in
practice. 21' The author recognizes that it will be difficult to measure the
281. Id. at 262. In reaching this question, the Court did not reach the question of whether the
Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the incorporation doctrine. Id. at 276 n.22.
282. Id. at 262-64 n.3.
283. Id.
284. See Tremper, supra note 9, at 445.
285. See Browning-Ferrs, 492 U.S. at 262-64 n.3.
286. See supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 277-86 and accompanying text.
288. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1693-96. Under this plan, the state either
could directly subsidize charities, allowing them to purchase liability insurance, or could establish
state-run insurance pools to protect charities from liability. Id. at 1693.
289. Id. at 1694-95. Even though this proposal suggests that government subsidies should be
given to charities based on the amount of public benefits they produce, it does not suggest how
"public benefits" should be defined or measured. Id.
290. Id. at 1694-96.
291. See infra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
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amount of public benefit produced by charities.' The author also recognizes
that this plan will have the effect of under-subsidizing unpopular and less
politically powerful charities.' Yet the author dismisses these problems by
suggesting that the democratic political process will fix the amount of subsidy
at the proper level.'
Although it is questionable whether the political process could fix the
amount of subsidy at the proper level, the author of this proposal ignores the
fact that states are currently facing economic hardships and are unlikely to have
the substantial resources to fund all charities that produce public benefits. 5
In addition, this author's proposal simply goes too far toward supporting the
viability of the charitable sector. If the states had sufficient funds to subsidize
most charitable activity, it is likely that the states would provide those services
themselves. Moreover, under this system, the burden of a punitive damage
award would fall on taxpayers and would have the effect of punishing innocent
taxpayers, in the form of increased taxes.'
Yet another proposal, adopted by some states, is to place a limit on the
amount of punitive damages that can be awarded against charities.' By
limiting the amount of punitive damages that can be assessed against charities,
charities are protected from large awards that can debilitate the charities' ability
to produce benefits for the public good.' However, one problem with such
damage caps is that they are arbitrary and bear no relation to the degree of harm
done by the tortious conduct.' Another problem with such damage caps is
that they encourage utilitarian cost-benefit calculations to determine if the benefit
292. See Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1694-95.
293. Id. at 1695-96.
294. Id.
295. See Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L.
REv. 1351, 1371-72 (1993) (reporting that over recent years, Bridgeport, Connecticut, East Saint
Louis, Illinois and Chelsea, Massachusetts declared bankruptcy and that 53.9% of cities were
running budget deficits in 1992).
296. Such a burden on innocent taxpayers would work as a punishment in the form of increased
taxes. As in the cases where punitive damages have been sought against municipalities, such a
punishment on innocent taxpayers has been criticized as contrary to public policy. See, e.g.,
Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981). See also supra notes 173-76, 201-
26 and accompanying text (discussing the punishment of innocent charitable donors by imposing
punitive damages on nonprofit corporations and charities).
297. See, e.g., MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85k (West 1986) (setting a damage cap at
$20,000). See also supra note 19 and sources cited therein (listing states that have enacted damage
caps to protect charities from full liability in tort).
298. See, e.g., English v. New England Medical Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 333-34 (1989)
(applying the Massachusetts damage cap provision and holding that damage caps do not violate
substantive due process protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution).
299. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 3, at 1392-93.
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produced by the activity outweighs the risk of liability?' Even though a
charity is aware that its activities might cause harm, the charity can more easily
weigh the benefit to be gained from the activity against the risk of liability if the
cost is fixed by the statutory damage cap."' Such weighing of costs and
benefits, with disregard for the welfare and rights of the victims, has been
criticized by courts as contrary to public policy.'( The unpredictable nature
of punitive damage awards imposed by juries prevents this cost-benefit analysis
by making the costs of a wrong somewhat variable.'
Finally, it should be noted that applying general split award statutes' in
cases where punitive damage awards have been obtained against charities may
also deprive society and beneficiaries of the benefits that charities produce.'0
Split award statutes provide for awards of punitive damages obtained by private
plaintiffs to be "split" between the plaintiffs and the state.' One of the
purposes of these general split award statutes is to ensure that punitive damage
awards are used for their proper purpose: the production of public benefits.' °7
However, applying these split award statutes to charities may be
problematic.' First, some of these statutes do not require the state to use the
300. See Amelia J. Toy, Note, Statuory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An
Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 325-326 (1991) ("[A]n arbitrary cap on punitive
damages awards ... sacrifice[s] the goals of punitive damages. A statutory cap reveals to a
potential tortfeasor his maximum expected costs.").
301. Cf. id. at 324-26 (arguing that damages caps make it possible to weigh costs and benefits
of tortious conduct).
302. See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard [1964] App. Cas. 1129, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367 (permitting
recovery of punitive damages were the defendant has disregarded the plaintiff's rights by calculating
costs and benefits). See also Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388 (1981); Gryc
v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Minn. 1980) (awarding punitive damages because
the defendant's callous weighing of costs and benefits rose to the level of recklessness), cited in
Kotler, supra note 72, at 89, 91, 103.
303. See, e.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981) (describing the
"unpredictable and, at times, substantial" nature of punitive damage awards). See also Toy, supra
note 300, at 324-26 (discussing the variable nature of punitive damage awards).
304. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)-(4)(West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(3)
(1987), cited in Sloane, supra'note 66 (providing that punitive damage awards be "split" between
the plaintiff and the state).
305. For a discussion of how applying split award statutes to charities may deprive both society
and beneficiaries of benefits, see supra notes 245-53 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (1987) (providing that 75% of punitive damage
awards obtained by private plaintiffs be given to the state), cited in Sloane, supra note 66. See also
supra note 304 and statutes cited therein.
307. See Sloane, supra note 66, at 490 (arguing that split award statutes attempt to actualize
the true purpose of punitive damages by "improv[ing] the quality of life in society").
308. See infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
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money it obtains from punitive damage awards for the public good.'
Transferring funds from charities to the state without any statutory guarantee
that the money will be used for the public good could arguably result in a
reduction of public benefits produced by the charitable sector.
On the other hand, some split award statutes require that the states use the
money they obtain from these "split award" schemes for specific public welfare
programs. 310  But transferring funds from one charity to public welfare
programs would not guarantee that the beneficiaries of a particular charity would
continue to receive the same benefits that they received from the charity had the
money remained in the charitable sector.31 1 Therefore, to prevent deprivations
of benefits to society and beneficiaries, it would be preferable to return punitive
damage awards to the charitable sector.3" 2
VI. A NEW PROPOSAL - SPLTTING THE AwARD BETWEEN THE PRIVATE
PLAINTIFF AND THE CHARITABLE SECTOR
While the proposals discussed above do not provide workable solutions to
the dilemmas created by imposing punitive damages on charities, this does not
mean that reform is not needed. First, there is no good reason to exempt
commercial and mutual benefit nonprofit organizations from punitive damage
award liability.31 3  Commercial nonprofit organizations and mutual benefit
organizations engage in the production of private benefits for those
"beneficiaries" who can afford to pay the price charged. 3 4 If the price of the
goods or services provided by the commercial nonprofit organization becomes
too high, the beneficiaries can seek substitute goods or services elsewhere. 315
Moreover, even though a punitive damage award against mutual benefit
309. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (3) (1989) (providing that punitive damage awards
obtained by the state through the split award mechanism be used in the state's general fund), cited
in Sloane, supra note 66, at 477 n.24.
310. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. .§ 537.675(1) (1987) (providing that monies obtained by the
state from split award schemes be used in a tort victim's compensation fund), cited in Sloane, supra
note 66, at 477 n.24.
311. For example, consider beneficiaries of a charity homeless shelter in Missouri. Under
Missouri's split award statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (1987), cited in Sloane, supra note 66,
at 477 n.24, if a punitive damage award was obtained against the shelter, the money would go to
the state's Tort Victim Compensation Fund. The beneficiaries of the homeless shelter would then
be deprived of benefits that they would have received from the shelter, because the shelter will have
fewer assets to produce benefits and the state will use the money it obtained to compensate tort
victims, not to make sure that the beneficiaries of the homeless shelter continue to receive benefits.
312. For a proposal that would leave punitive damage awards in the charitable sector, see infra
notes 313-43 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
314. See Nonprofit Enerprise, supra note 11, at 892-93; Evolving Law, supra note 11, at 813.
315. See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
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associations and private clubs may punish the organizations' members, such an
effect may be preferable to immunity because members are in a position to
control the future conduct of the organization." 6 Finally, awarding punitive
damages against these organizations will deter harmful conduct and will make
a statement that society will not tolerate tortious conduct.
31 7
However, with respect to traditional charities, while punitive damage
awards may have a deterrent effect on charities' tortious actions, there is little
justification for taking money from the charitable sector, where it will
presumably be used for public benefit, and placing the money in the hands of
a private plaintiff.318  Charities will be deterred from committing future torts
by punitive damage awards regardless of whether the punitive damage award
inures to the benefit of a private plaintiff or whether the punitive damage award
is used for the public good. In addition, there is no good reason why a private
plaintiff should gain a windfall from a punitive damage award when that money
would otherwise be used for the public good.
A balance between the competing policies of deterring tortious conduct on
the part of charities and preventing the depletion of resources of the charitable
sector can be achieved by holding charities liable for punitive damages while
returning the award to the charitable sector. Yet the money taken from one
charity would have to be refunded to a different charity to achieve a deterrent
effect. The following model statute which provides for the return of a punitive
damage award obtained against charities to the charitable sector would deter
individual charities while ensuring that the assets of the charitable sector are not
depleted. This addresses the concern that awarding punitive damages against
charities will prevent the charitable sector from being able to produce benefits
for the public.319 In addition, even if a punitive damage award over-deters
charities from engaging in socially beneficial conduct, that over-deterrence will
be offset by refunding the award to the charitable sector.
DEFN1TION
A charity within the meaning of this statute is any organization
determined by the Internal Revenue Service to meet the requirements
of Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3).
Commentary: The definition of a charity under Internal Revenue Code §
501(c)(3) has been interpreted to require that the organization have a charitable
316. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 26 and sources cited therein.
319. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
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purpose,3' operate in the public interest,"' and serve a sufficiently broad
public.' These criteria comport with the common law notions of what it
means for an organization to be a "charity.w323 In fact, a few states already
use these criteria to determine charitable status for the purpose of tort
immunity.
32
While the standard set forth in Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) is
intended to delineate the criteria for tax exemption,' there is no reason why
it cannot be used in the context of tort law as well.' First, although the
Code lists certain purposes that qualify as "charitable," 3' the term is open-
ended and has been construed to include organizations that engage in activities
that do not fit within the listed purposes. ' Second, the organization must
serve the public interest. 2 This requirement encompasses those organizations
that produce public benefits.3 ' Finally, by requiring that the organization
serve a sufficiently broad public, the tax code insures that the benefit of
charitable status flows to a broad class of beneficiaries.
3 1
These requirements comport with the policy justifications for engineering
320. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988) (providing that an organization must have, inter alia, a
charitable purpose to qualify for tax exemption).
321. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1982). In Bob Jones, the Supreme
Court upheld an Internal Revenue Service ruling denying tax exempt status to organizations that
engage in racially discriminatory practices. Id. at 595-96.
322. Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113; Rev. Rul. 56-403, 1956-2 C.B. 307.
323. I.R.C § 501(c)(3) (1988) does not require that an organization serve only the poor in order
to obtain tax exempt status. However, as was recognized at the common law, while organizations
may not serve the needy, they can still produce public benefits and be considered "charitable." See
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230 ("Both courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long
recognized that the statutory requirement of being 'organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable,.., or educational purposes' was intended to express the basic common law concept [of
charity]."). See also supra note 2 and sources cited therein for a discussion of the common law
notion of "charitable."
324. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-312(a)(5) (1994). See also supra note
20 and sources cited therein.
325. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1988) (stating that an organization defined in § 501(c) is entitled to
tax exemption).
326. See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
327. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) lists the following purposes as entitled to tax exemption: religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, educational, or testing for public safety.
328. See TREAS. REG. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended 1976).
329. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586-90 (1983). In the course of its
opinion, the Court discussed the policies underlying tax exemption for charities. Id. at 585. The
Court stated that in enacting I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988), "Congress sought to . . . encourage the
development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose ... " Id. at 587.
330. Id. at 586-90.
331. See Rav. RUL. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113; REV. RUL. 56-403 1956-2 C.B. 307.
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a special rule of punitive damages with respect to charities. 332 Assessing
punitive damages against charities may deprive the public of benefits that would
otherwise be produced had the charity been exempt from punitive damages.333
A broad class of beneficiaries also may suffer if charities are held liable for
punitive damages.3 ' Therefore, defining charities by the work that they do
and the people that they serve is useful both in terms of tax exempt status and
in terms of punitive damage liability.
Using tax exempt status for determining whether an organization is
charitable also has another major advantage. Tax exempt status is
predetermined by the Internal Revenue Service.335 This predetermination will
prevent expensive and time consuming litigation over the issue of whether an
organization is charitable.
LLunarry
Nonprofit organizations, including charities, shall be liablefor punitive
damages in all cases where punitive damages are available under state
law, regardless of their nonprofit or charitable status.
Commentary: This section forwards the policy that nonprofit organizations
are deterred by punitive damage awards. This section also recognizes that
punitive damages have a deterrent effect on charities as well. However, this
statute is not intended to interfere with state law regarding the burden of proof
nor the standard of culpability necessary for the imposition of punitive
damages. 3" In other words, this section merely contemplates that nonprofit
organizations and charities will be liable for punitive damages under state law,
as would any other defendant.
SPLrrrING THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD
Only in cases where a charity is a defendant, upon entry of a final
judgment against a defendant-charity for punitive damages, the judge
shall have discretion to compute the percentage of the punitive damage
332. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 241-44 and accompanying text.
335. Using tax exempt status to determine whether organizations should be treated favorably
by tort law is not an entirely new concept. Some states already use I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status to
determine whether an organization qualifies for limited or qualified immunity. See, e.g., MD. CODE
ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. ANN. § 5-312(a)(5) (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-19-1(3) (1994).
Cf., Tremper, supra note 9, at 459 (arguing that modified I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) criteria should be used
to determine whether an organization should be treated favorably under tort law).
336. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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award to be awarded to the plaintiff by considering the amount
reasonably necessary to reward the plaintifffor pursuing the punitive
damage claim, including reasonable attorney fees. That amount shall
be awarded to the plaintiff. The remaining amount of the award shall
be awarded by the court to a charity that is substantially similar to the
defendant-charity.
Commentary: This section attempts to implement a modified private
attorney general policy by recognizing that some reward should be given to the
plaintiff for prosecuting egregious conduct that should be punished and
deterred.337 This section also recognizes that very few claims for punitive
damages will be brought if the plaintiff has to bear the cost of litigating a
punitive damage claim without any prospect of reimbursement for the expense
of litigating the claim.
On the other hand, this statute does not allow the entire punitive damage
award to inure to the benefit of a private plaintiff. The statute provides that a
percentage of the award shall be returned to the charitable sector by the trial
judge. This scheme has several advantages. First, it returns the award to the
charitable sector to be used for the public benefit, while deterring the individual
charity that committed the tort. Second, because the money will return to the
charitable sector, the beneficiaries of the charities will still receive the benefits
that they would have received before the punitive damage award was assessed.
Third, this scheme achieves a minimal depletion of the resources of the
charitable sector. Fourth, if the assessment of punitive damages has any over-
deterrent effect on charitable activity, that over-deterrence will be countered by
subsidizing charitable activity through the return of the punitive damage award
to the charitable sector. Finally, other nonprofit organizations, such as
commercial nonprofit organizations, mutual benefit associations, and private
clubs, are not included in this distribution scheme because, as discussed in this
Note, there is no good policy justification for protecting these organizations
from punitive damage awards. 33
DISMUTION
In determining whether a charity is substantially similar to the
defendant-charity, the judge shall consider: the nature of the
charitable activities in which the defendant engages, the intended
beneficiaries of the charity, and the public benefit produced by the
charity. The judge shall not consider the religious affiliation of the
337. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "private attorney
general" theory.
338. See supra notes 313-17 and accompanying text.
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charity in making this determination. The defendant charity shall bear
the burden of proving which charities are substantially similar to the
defendant charity.
Commentary: A judge will face a myriad of choices when attempting to
decide whether a charity is substantially similar to the defendant charity.
However, the purpose of the distribution scheme suggested in this statute is to
protect society, beneficiaries, and donors from potential adverse effects of
assessing punitive damage awards against charities. Thejudge must consider the
purpose of the charitable activity in which the defendant charity engages and the
beneficiaries of that charitable activity when deciding which charity shall receive
the charity portion of the punitive damage award.
To ensure that the trial judge does not have unbridled discretion in choosing
a charity that is substantially similar to the defendant-charity, the defendant
charity shall have the burden to bring to the court's attention those charities that
are substantially similar to the defendant charity. The defendant-charity should
have an important interest in ensuring that the punitive damage award will be
returned to a charity that will serve the same population and produce the same
public benefits. At any rate, this should not be an onerous burden on the
defendant charity because the defendant charity will presumably be familiar with
the charities in the community that provide similar services.
Admittedly, this scheme may present several problems. First, the judge
will be presented with the question of whether a charity with a religious
affiliation provides special public benefits because of its religious character. The
judge may be inclined to ask whether religion is a public benefit or whether one
charity is substantially similar to another merely because of similar religious
affiliations. Such considerations would arguably expose this statute to the
constitutional limitations of the Establishment Clause. 3 However, this statute
avoids such constitutional challenges by providing that such considerations by
the judge are prohibited in determining which charity will receive the
award. 3'
Another problem presented by this statute is that it arguably creates an
inefficient transfer." By taking money from the hands of one charity and
placing it in the hands of another with the resources being used in substantially
339. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also infra notes 367-78 and accompanying text (applying
establishment clause tests to the model statute proposed).
340. See infra notes 357-78 and accompanying text.
341. Cf. McMenamin, supra note 65, at 19 (arguing that split award statutes that provide for
punitive damage awards to be divided between the plaintiff and the state, as applied to nonprofit
corporations, create an "inefficient transfer").
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the same manner, it could be argued that all that is achieved is the transfer of
money and nothing else. However, this ignores the argument that the defendant
charity will be deterred from future tortious conduct. The transfer, therefore,
is not inefficient because it produces a deterrent effect on the tortfeasor charity
that would not otherwise be present if the transfer had not been made.
Yet the judge making the award should consider the potential inefficiency
of the statute. This statute clearly contemplates that the award should not find
its way back into the hands of the defendant charity. The judge, therefore,
should make sure that the charity receiving the award is organizationally distinct
from the defendant charity.
ENFORCEMENT
After a percentage of the award is awarded to a charity that is
substantially similar to the defendant charity, the substantially similar
charity designated by the court shall be deemed a judgment-lien
creditor secure to the amount of the award.
Commentary: This section allows the designated charity the ability to
enforce the punitive damage award in court. The charity, rather than a state
actor, should have this enforcement power to avoid the constitutional difficulties
associated with the Excessive Fines Clause.' 2 By providing that the charity
is a judgment-lien creditor, there is no need for the state to become a party to
the action. Moreover, under this scheme, no part of the award is given to the
state. Therefore, this statute should withstand analysis under the Excessive
Fines Clause enunciated in Browning-Ferris.3
JURY INSTRUCTION
The jury shall not be instructed about the distribution scheme in this
statute at any time during the litigation.
Commentary: The purpose of this section is to ensure that the jury does
not inflate the punitive damage award as a result of this distribution scheme. If
made aware of this statute, the jury may inflate the award in an attempt to insure
that the plaintiff receives a larger award. In addition, the jury may also see
themselves as benefiting society by inflating the award if they know that a
percentage of the award will go to charity.
342. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
343. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989).
Barfield: Better to Give Than to Receive: Should Nonprofit Corporations and
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1995
1246 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
VII. THE CONSTITUTIONALrrY OF THE PROPOSED STATUTE
Several general split award statutes have been challenged under the Takings
Clause' of the Fifth Amendment. 3 5  Because the model statute proposed
by this Note suggests a split award scheme, this model statute is also likely to
be challenged under the Takings Clause. 3' In other words, it could be argued
that by requiring a plaintiff to split a punitive damage award, the statute
contemplates a taking of the plaintiffs property right in the punitive damage
award.
3 4
7
Under the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court has refused to develop any
set formula for determining when governmental action constitutes a taking. 
3
Rather, the Court has engaged in ad hoc factual inquiries to determine when a
taking has occurred.' " In making this inquiry, the Court has focused on
basically three factors: the character of the government action; the economic
impact of the regulation on the property owner; and the owner's reasonable
investment backed expectations." However, in order for a taking to occur,
the owner must have property that is affected by the government action.
351
Therefore, in analyzing a takings clause challenge to this model statute, it
is particularly important to recognize that punitive damages are not awarded as
of right.352 A plaintiff does not have a vested right to punitive damages under
344. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
345. This note does not attempt to present an exhaustive discussion of takings clause
jurisprudence. Rather, the purpose of the following discussion is to merely show that the split-award
statute proposed by this note would be held constitutional. For an in-depth discussion of cases
challenging general split award statutes based on the Takings Clause, see Sloane, supra note 66, at
495-99 (discussing Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991); Gordon v. State 585
So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1991); Sheperd v. Brice Petrides, 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991)).
346. See infra notes 347-56 and accompanying text.
347. See Sloane, supra note 66, at 495-99 (discussing takings clause challenges to general split
award statutes).
348. Penn Central Transp. Co v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
349. Id. at 124.
350. Id. at 124-25.
351. See, e.g., Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
citing United States ex. rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1943) ("A taking
compensable under the Fifth Amendment inherently requires the existence of 'private property.' As
a part of a takings case, the plaintiff must show a legally-cognizable property interest.").
352. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (reasoning that the right to have
punitive damages awarded is not a property right and that a state could abolish punitive damages
altogether), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1467 (1993). Accord Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice
Petrides-Donohue & Assoc., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991); Mack Trucks, Inc. v.
Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993), cited in Sloane, supra note 66, at 495-99.
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the common law.35 3  However, a plaintiff may obtain a right to a punitive
damage award if a statute creates such a right.3'
The proposed statute in this Note does not give the plaintiff a property
interest in the punitive damage award.3' The proposed statute provides only
that the judge has the discretion to give a part of the award to the plaintiff to
compensate the plaintiff for the time spent litigating the punitive damage
claim.3' Therefore, because the statute gives the plaintiff no vested property
interest in the punitive damage award, giving the award to a charity under the
statute does not amount to an unconstitutional taking.
A second challenge to this model statute could be made under the
Establishment Clause.3 7 If a punitive damage award is given to a religious
charity under the scheme provided by the model statute proposed in this Note,
353. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Assoc., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 85, 99 (M.D. Pa.
1984); Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 992 (Kan. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs have no right to
punitive damages at common law).
354. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 857 (1987) ("It is
axiomatic, of course, that state law . . . constitute[s] a property owner's bundle of property
rights.").
355. See supra notes 320-43 and accompanying text.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 336-38.
357. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause provides that: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." Id. The First Amendment applies to the state
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943). It
should be noted that this note does not intend to present an exhaustive discussion of establishment
clause jurisprudence. Rather, the purpose of this discussion is to show that the model statute
proposed by this note is constitutionally firm. For an in-depth discussion of establishment clause
jurisprudence, see Jack Alan Kramer, Note, Vouching for Educational Choice: If You Pay Them,
They Will Come, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 1005, 1026-1039 (1995).
It should also be noted the model statute proposed by this note could also be challenged under
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause provides that:
"Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Religious charities could argue that subjecting them to punitive damage awards under the model
statute proposed in this note involves an unconstitutional infringement of their right to free exercise
of their religion. Religious charities could argue that such an award would punish them for
exercising their religious beliefs if tenets of their respective religions required them to engage in
charitable activity. Religious charities could also argue that allowing punitive damage awards against
them would deplete their assets, thereby making them financially unable to exercise their religious
beliefs.
However, such a challenge is likely to fail. While the Free Exercise Clause affords an
absolute right to hold religious beliefs, it does not absolutely protect religious conduct. Employment
Div. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990). Courts have rejected free
exercise clause challenges to awards of punitive damages against religious institutions reasoning that
punitive damages punish conduct which results in secular harm and that such conduct is not
protected under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minn., 482
N.W.2d 806, 811 ( Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting a free exercise clause challenge to punitive
damage award against diocese of Roman Catholic Church).
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the award could be challenged as favoring one recipient religion over others.
The model statute could also be challenged under the Establishment Clause if,
over time, several punitive damage awards were given to the same religious
charities.
The traditional test for determining whether government action violates the
Establishment Clause was set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzmann.3' Under the
Lemon test, governmental action does not violate the Establishment Clause if the
action is motivated by a valid secular purpose, if it does not have the primary
effect of advancing religion, and if the government action does not foster
excessive entanglement with religion.3 " Under the first prong of the Lemon
test, the Supreme Court has given great deference to legislatures in determining
if a statute has a valid secular purpose.' Under the second prong of the
Lemon test, the Court has looked to several factors to determine whether
government action has the primary effect of advancing religion." The Court
has stated that a statute does not have the primary effect of advancing religion
where the government action benefits a large class of beneficiaries.2 The
court has also held that government action does not have the primary effect of
advancing religion if the government action confers benefits without regard for
the religious nature of the recipient of those benefits. Finally, the Supreme
Court has held that government aid to religious organizations constitutes
excessive entanglement only where there is significant interaction between the
church and the state in the administration of the aid.' However, the trend
of the Court is toward applying a less stringent "endorsement test" in
establishment clause cases.' Under this test, the Court would ask whether
government action "convey[s] or attempt[s] to convey a message that a particular
religion or religious belief is favored or preferred."'"
358. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1973).
359. Id.
360. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983). See also Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 74-75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If a legislature expresses a plausible secular
purpose... then courts should generally defer to that stated intent.").
361. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The factors that the Court has considered are, inter alia,
whether the government action aids a broad class of beneficiaries and whether the government action
confers benefits without regard for the secular nature of the recipient of the aid. For a discussion
of these factors, see supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 397-98 (1983).
363. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2467 (1993).
364. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 688 (1971).
365. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2467 (1993); Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67-84 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
366. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The model statute proposed by this Note should survive all of the
establishment clause tests set out by the Supreme Court.' First, the model
statute should be held constitutional under the "endorsement test."I Even if
a judge awards a punitive damage judgment to a religious charity under the
scheme proposed by this model statute, the award should not be seen as
conveying a message that "a particular religion or religious belief is
preferred."' The award will have the effect of favoring charities, not
religions or religious beliefs. If punitive damage awards are given to religious
charities under the model statute proposed by this Note, it is because they are
substantially similar to the defendant charities; it is merely coincidental that they
are also religiously affiliated.
Finally, the proposed model statute should also survive a Lemon test
analysis.310  First, the statute has a secular purpose: deterring charities from
engaging in tortious activity while protecting the charitable sector from economic
ruin. 37 1 Second, the statute has the primary effect of advancing charities; it
does not have the primary effect of advancing religion.3 2 Even if an award
of punitive damages is given to religious charities under the model statute, the
award will be given to religious charities without regard for their religious
affiliation." 3 Moreover, if an award of punitive damages is given to religious
charities under this model statute, the award will benefit a large class of
beneficiaries by ensuring the viability of the charitable sector. 374 Finally, the
proposed model statute does not encourage excessive government entanglement
with religion.375 In determining what charities are substantially similar to the
367. See infra text accompanying notes 368-78.
368. For a discussion of the endorsement test, see supra text accompanying notes 365-66.
369. Justice O'Connor enunciated the endorsement test using this language in Wallace, 472
U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
370. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. For a discussion of the Lemon test and its development and
place in first amendment jurisprudence, see supra text accompanying notes 358-66.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 337-38.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 320-34.
373. The model statute specifically directs the trial judge to ignore the religious nature of the
charity when deciding if the charity is substantially similar to the defendant-charity. See supra text
accompanying notes 339-40.
374. In fact, the punitive damage award, even if given to religious charities, will benefit the
state, taxpayers, and society. Society has an interest in seeing that charities remain economically
viable because charities reduce social problems and remove a welfare burden from the state. If
charities are financially strapped by punitive damage awards or are over-deterred by being held fully
liable in tort, the state will have to compensate for the reduction of charitable services by increasing
welfare services. This will, in turn, result in increased taxes. Therefore, the model statute proposed
by this note goes beyond benefiting a broad class of charitable beneficiaries: the scheme benefits
society in general.
375. See infra text accompanying notes 376-78.
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defendant charity, the judge cannot consider religion. 6 The judge also may
not "oversee" the award after it is given to the religious charities.377
Therefore, the proposed model statute satisfies all three prongs of the Lemon test
and should be held constitutionally valid, even as applied to awards of punitive
damages to religious charities.37
VIM. CONCLUSION
The proposed model statute advanced by this Note attempts to strike a
workable balance between competing policy justifications. First, the proposed
model statute recognizes that modem nonprofit corporations, mutual benefit
associations, and private clubs should not be exempt from punitive damage
awards. However, the proposed model statute also imposes full liability on
charities while attempting to leave a large portion of the resources for use in the
charitable sector. By imposing this scheme, the proposed statute contemplates
that punitive damages have a deterrent effect on charities and will prevent future
tortious conduct. Yet the statute confronts the problems of over-deterrence of
charitable activity and depletion of charitable resources by ensuring that a part
of the punitive damage award remains in the charitable sector.
Daniel A. Barfield
376. It would be constitutionally impermissible for a judge to inquire as to whether a particular
religion benefits society. The proposed model statute in this note avoids this problem by putting this
inquiry beyond the power of the trial judges. See supra text accompanying notes 339-40.
377. Under the model statute, after the judge makes the award to a charity, the involvement of
the judge is over unless the religious charity brings proceedings to enforce the judgment. The judge
will not have to oversee the award after it is distributed from the defendant charity. This should
satisfy the "excesive entanglement" prong of the Lemon test by avoiding significant interaction
between church and state in the administration of the aid.
378. Lemon v. Kurtzmann, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1973). For a discussion of the application
of the Lemon test to the model statute proposed in this note, see supra text accompanying notes 367-
77.
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